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The Art of Legal Reasoning and the Angst of Judging:
Of Balls, Strikes, and Moments of Truth*
Timothy P. Terrell**
ABSTRACT
An essay of only five short paragraphs published several years ago by the noted Harvard
paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould about a controversial call by baseball umpire Babe Pinelli
provides all the foundation necessary for a thorough investigation of the phenomenon of legal
reasoning. The present article contrasts Gould’s analysis of a “strike” with the comment by
then-Judge John Roberts at his Supreme Court confirmation hearings that he just wanted to
“call [the] balls and strikes,” and through this exchange develops a new approach toward
identifying—and teaching—the basic elements of sophisticated legal thinking. This article
divides legal reasoning into four interrelated elements that anchor and structure the complex
process that lays “beneath” the more traditional references to “analogy” and
“characterization” and the like on which the existing literature on the topic focuses. The
challenge of legal reasoning, and the difficulty of being a decision-maker in this context, arise
from the fact that each of these elements generates its own special forms of disagreement and
controversy, all of which lawyers and judges attempt to resolve satisfactorily. The result is a
complicated, but patterned, thought process that corresponds to the equally complicated, but
patterned, nature of the law itself. The four elements of legal reasoning developed in detail here
are:
1) Text: understanding the subtle “is/ought” distinction that animates the language in
which the law is expressed;
2) Context: identifying with care the “scale” of the circumstances (micro or macro) that
will characterize the legal controversy;
3) Hypertext: determining not just the normative values, but the kind of values (categorical
or consequential) that will justify an argument or result; and
*

A catchier title to this article would have been, of course, “The Umpire Strikes Back,” but it was used by Fay
Vincent, the former Deputy Commissioner of Baseball, in an op-ed piece in July 2007 in the New York Times for a
comment on the nature of modern umpiring, not legal reasoning. I would like to acknowledge the thoughtful
comments I have received on earlier drafts of this article from a number of my faculty colleagues at Emory Law
School, from colloquia discussions and otherwise. In this regard, I would like to thank in particular Professors
Robert Shapiro, Morgan Cloud, and John Witte. I have also received useful perspectives on the article’s discussion
of the task of judging from sitting judges who have taken the time to review this effort—most particularly, Judge
David V. Brewer, Chief Judge of the Oregon Court of Appeals, and Judge Emeritus Bea Ann Smith of the Texas
Court of Appeals. I also have to thank Emory Law School students too numerous to mention for their remarkable
patience and frequent insights over the years as we explored Professor Gould’s essay together, see infra note 55.
Finally, I also acknowledge the remarkable research assistance provided by (then) Emory Law School student
Alexander Ritchie.
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4) Subtext: appreciating the institutional and political circumstances of the judiciary within
our form of government.
The last of these categories will in fact be argued as the true, or at least the only
plausible, basis for Justice Roberts’ evidently simplistic comment about “balls and strikes.”
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I. INTRODUCTION: CONSIDERING THE CASE OF GOULD V. ROBERTS

A few years ago, The New York Times reported sad news, as it regularly does, on its front
page. It was a death, and an obituary followed. But this newsworthy event did not involve a
politician or world leader or any other expected category. It was instead the story of the passing
of a zoology professor: Stephen Jay Gould, Harvard’s prolific author of both popular and
scholarly books and essays on biology, paleontology, and evolutionary theory, who had died at
the age of 60 after a long battle with cancer. 1 Professor Gould was such an unusually wellknown scientist, teacher, and commentator that his death merited serious acknowledgement. But
the obituary failed to mention, and in fact few people even know of, what may be one of his
finest publications. It had little or nothing to do with science, however. It was about much more:
truth, justice, language, law, and particularly the angst of judging.
In a very short, but remarkably profound, essay he published (ironically enough) in the
2
Times, and indeed as a eulogy for someone else, Professor Gould presented in five paragraphs
all the ingredients necessary to summarize most of any law school course in jurisprudence, even
though his topic had nothing directly to do with the law. He was commenting instead on his other
great passion outside of science and scientific theory: baseball. I have for many years used this
essay as the opening foray for law students into the mysteries of clear rules that aren’t, of sources
of authority that implicitly claim to be complete but aren’t, of decision makers—like judges—
who must cope with being “final” but also with being human and imperfect, and much more. I
have also occasionally raised Gould’s essay with judicial audiences to provoke conversation
about the reasonableness or legitimacy of the example of quick decision making that Gould
praises and memorializes. I have happily speculated along with students and judges about what
Professor Gould may have meant by various provocative passages, for he himself provided us
with very little additional commentary on this essay. 3 We are left to wonder what his responses
might be to the weighty issues his essay so effortlessly raises.
Gould’s analysis of baseball has become timely again by recent hearings for nominees to
the Supreme Court. It started with Chief Justice John Roberts, who noted during his confirmation
that his modest ambition was only “to call [the] balls and strikes” 4 as best he could, an analogy
that has since been echoed less “officially” in comments by pundits and politicians in later
confirmation processes as well. 5 This seemingly innocuous remark has been criticized, however,
as being a disingenuous understatement of the nature and role of a Supreme Court Justice, if not
of the judicial role more generally. 6 Gould’s essay is, I believe, directly relevant to this point,

1

Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Stephen Jay Gould, 60, Is Dead; Enlivened Evolutionary Theory, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2002,
at A1.
2
Stephen Jay Gould, Op-Ed., The Strike That Was Low and Outside, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1984, at 23.
3
See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE FLAMINGO’S SMILE: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 227-29 (1985) [hereinafter
GOULD].
4
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., nominee to be
Chief Justice of the United States).
5
See Bruce Weber, Umpires v. Judges, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/weekinreview/12weber.html?_r=0.
6
See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 186 (2005) (questioning by Senator Joe Biden). Senator
Joe Biden pointed out:
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and reveals a profound irony underlying Chief Justice Roberts’s sports reference: Despite the
fact that both of them use the same regulatory concept (a “strike”) to make their argument,
Professor Gould views baseball as subjective, and thus like the law, while Chief Justice Roberts
views the law as objective, and thus like baseball. Their perspectives could hardly be more
divergent. 7
But the situation might be even worse. One lesson that could be drawn from the
distinction between Professor Gould and Chief Justice Roberts is that the latter may have a
remarkably simplistic understanding of not only baseball, but of objectivity itself. Chief Justice
Roberts’s comment is reminiscent of the famously profound observation by an earlier Justice
Roberts—Owen—who also saw nothing particularly complicated in the judicial function: The
Court was “to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is
challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former.” 8
Through the convenient medium of Professor Gould’s essay, I shall argue that the effort
to minimize judicial reasoning to rote exercises of robotic comparison is demeaning to every
judge in this country, including Chief Justice Roberts himself.
Nevertheless, Professor Gould’s analysis potentially justifies Chief Justice Roberts’s
comment at least in part, even though that would no doubt come as a surprise to both of them.
This support is based in appreciating the specific role of the umpire or judge within the “game”
being played—a point we will explore in detail at the end of this essay. 9
To demonstrate the richness and importance of Gould’s article, I need do no more than
allow you to read it for yourself. Without further ado, the entire essay is presented below.
Thereafter, I will discuss the points I believe make it relevant to legal theory in general—that is,
to an understanding of law as a functioning social institution—and to theories of judicial
reasoning and decision making in particular. My comments, however, will do no more than
[Rehnquist] used the phrase “tacit postulates.” He said that these tacit postulates are as much
ingrained in the fabric of the [Constitution] as its express provisions. . . . Chief Justice Rehnquist
made this vital point [in a case] about States’ rights [regarding] language that didn’t speak directly
to [the States] in the Constitution. And he concluded the answer was a rule he was able to infer
from the overall constitutional plan.
So, Judge, you are going to be an inferer. You are not going to be an umpire. Umpires do
not infer. They do not get to infer. Every Justice has to infer.
Id.
One objection to this entire enterprise of comparing baseball and the law should be confronted and put to rest. An
obvious reason for the divergence of the approaches of Professor Gould and Chief Justice Roberts to objectivity and
subjectivity is the physical differences between baseball and courtrooms: While the rules of baseball are, by and
large, “objective” in the sense of being quite specific about the physical circumstances in which they are to be
applied, “subjectivity” nevertheless enters the picture because an umpire must make snap decisions where human
senses may not have perceived all the available data perfectly. Legal situations, on the other hand, are “subjective”
in the sense that the law cannot possibly predict all future circumstances to which it might be applied, and the law
itself is expressed in human language, which is notoriously malleable. Nevertheless, judges have the luxury of time,
allowing development of facts and opportunities for reflection, to create the impression that their decisions are, all
things considered, “objective” and mandated, rather than capricious. Thus, umpiring and judging are connected by
the fact that both seek a justification for asserting certainty in the face of uncertainty: baseball, because its
circumstances put umpires under significant pressure; the law, because its constituent materials put judges under
similar pressure. And that “pressure” needs to be appreciated. Umpires and judges both exist not for the purpose of
making easy calls, but for making tough ones. Chief Justice Roberts’s use of the baseball analogy is therefore worth
exploring.
8
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). We will note a similar comment from Montesquieu later. See infra
note 120.
9
See infra text accompanying notes 112-119.
7
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demonstrate how much more could and should be said about Gould’s essay. Despite this article’s
length and ambition, it is still only an article, while a topic as broad as legal reasoning ordinarily
elicits a book. I concede, then, that every element of the analysis to be presented here—including
the development of each of the constituent pieces of the alternative model of legal reasoning I
will propose—will necessarily be incomplete. I nevertheless believe that enough can be said in
this format to do justice to Gould’s analysis of justice, and to allow us to judge his understanding
of judging so that we can usefully reconsider the idea of “thinking like a lawyer.”
A. Gould’s Essay
Gould’s essay, which first appeared with a different title in the New York Times on
November 10, 1984, was reprinted in his book, The Flamingo’s Smile, along with a short
commentary by him acknowledging the praise the essay has received. But his commentary also
indicated, as we will see later, how limited his appreciation was of the implications of his
analysis. In particular, I think you will find that one of his most pointed observations about the
judicial role—one that he probably made inadvertently—is captured in the essay’s last two
words.
STRIKE THREE FOR BABE
Tiny and perfunctory reminders often provoke floods of memory. I have just read
a little notice, tucked away on the sports pages: “Babe Pinelli, long time major
league umpire, died Monday at age 89 at a convalescent home near San
Francisco.”
What could be more elusive than perfection? And what would you rather
be—the agent or the judge? Babe Pinelli was the umpire in baseball’s unique
episode of perfection when it mattered most. October 8, 1956. A perfect game in
the World Series—and, coincidentally, Pinelli’s last official game as arbiter. What
a consummate swan song. Twenty-seven Brooks up; twenty-seven Bums down.
And, since single acts of greatness are intrinsic spurs to democracy, the agent was
a competent, but otherwise undistinguished Yankee pitcher, Don Larsen.
The dramatic end was all Pinelli’s, and controversial ever since. Dale
Mitchell, pinch-hitting for Sal Maglio, was the twenty-seventh batter. With a
count of 1 and 2, Larsen delivered one high and outside—close, but surely not, by
its technical definition, a strike. Mitchell let the pitch go by, but Pinelli didn’t
hesitate. Up went the right arm for called strike three. Out went Yogi Berra from
behind the plate, nearly tackling Larsen in a frontal jump of joy. “Outside by a
foot,” groused Mitchell later. He exaggerated—for it was outside by only a few
inches—but he was right. Babe Pinelli, however, was more right. A batter may
not take a close pitch with so much on the line. Context matters. Truth is a
circumstance, not a spot.
I was a junior at Jamaica High School. On that day, every teacher let us
listen, even Mrs. B., our crusty old solid geometer (and, I guess in retrospect, a
secret baseball fan). We reached Mrs. G., our even crustier French teacher, in the
bottom of the seventh, and I was appointed to plead. “Ya gotta let us listen,” I
said, “it’s never happened before.” “Young man,” she replied, “this class is a
39
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French class.” Luckily, I sat in the back just in front of Bob Hacker (remember
alphabetical seating?), a rabid Dodger fan with earphone and portable. Halfway
through the period, following Pinelli’s last strike, I felt a sepulchral tap and
looked around. Hacker’s face was ashen. “He did it—that bastard did it.” I
cheered loudly and threw my jacket high in the air. “Young man,” said Mrs. G.
from the side board, “I’m sure the verb écrire can’t be that exciting.” It cost me
10 points on my final grade, maybe admission to Harvard as well. I never
experienced a moment of regret.
Truth is inflexible. Truth is inviolable. By long and recognized custom, by
any concept of justice, Dale Mitchell had to swing at anything close. It was a
strike—a strike high and outside. Babe Pinelli, umpiring his last game, ended with
his finest, his most perceptive, his most truthful moment. Babe Pinelli, arbiter of
history, walked into the locker room and cried. 10
The purpose of parsing this extraordinary essay is not simply to acknowledge the many
directions in which a conversation about it could go, but to focus on how remarkably well it
serves as a useful introduction to two topics fundamental to legal education: 11 the key elements
of legal reasoning, and the personal challenge judges face when making a difficult and close
10

What a remarkable piece of work. Gould later acknowledged that he wrote it “in a quarter hour’s flood of
inspiration during an interminable round of speechmaking at my son’s annual Little League banquet . . . .” GOULD,
supra note 3, at 227. It depresses me to realize that even after a lifetime of work, and given unlimited time, I will
never be able to write like this.
This is not, by the way, the only story about the umpiring of Babe Pinelli. He himself wrote an article for a
book on baseball lore in which he described an encounter with another Babe—Ruth, of course—when Pinelli was a
rookie umpire and Ruth was at the close of his career. Pinelli writes that he was told that one did not call close
pitches as strikes when The Babe was at bat, but he did so anyway. After being fussed at by Ruth, who claimed that
“forty thousand [people in this park] know that was a ball, tomato-head!” Pinelli calmly responded, “Maybe so . . .
but mine is the only opinion that counts.” Babe Pinelli, Kill the Umpire? Don’t Make Me Laugh!, in THE SECOND
FIRESIDE BOOK OF BASEBALL 278 (Charles Einstein ed., 1958).
I should also acknowledge that to some readers, Gould’s baseball references (“high and outside” and the like)
may not be comprehensible. Indeed, this became evident in the law school class in which I used this essay to initiate
an analysis of “law,” see infra note 55. For example, one student from the Bahamas complained that while she
understood cricket, baseball was a mystery. Another student, from France, misunderstood important aspects of
Gould’s analysis because she thought that the key to the essay was the fact that the batter had been inappropriately
standing on one of the lines on the field (“with so much on the line”).
To respond briefly to the specialized cultural knowledge required, I will note that a “strike”—in the specific
circumstances of Gould’s essay—is a pitch by the pitcher that the batter should have tried to hit, but did not. This
kind of pitch places the baseball within an area where it is reasonable for the batter to swing at it—a space over the
width of the “home plate” which is in front of the batter, and no higher than the batter’s armpits and no lower than
the batter’s knees. The point of the essay, then, is that Larson’s pitch was, according to this definition, not a strike,
but a “ball”—it was too “high” and also “outside” the width of home plate. But Umpire Pinelli nevertheless called
the pitch a strike anyway (and quite correctly, according to Gould).
11
The idea of connecting the rules of baseball to the rule of law is hardly new. See, e.g., Aside, The Common Law
Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1474 (1975); Charles Yablon, On the Contribution of Baseball to
American Legal Theory, 104 YALE L.J. 227 (1994); BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND (Spencer Weber
Waller, Neil B. Cohen & Paul Finkelman eds., 1995); William D. Araiza et al., The Jurisprudence of Yogi Berra, 46
EMORY L.J. 697 (1997); Paul Finkelman, Baseball and the Rule of Law Revisited, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 17
(2002); Neil B. Cohen & Spencer Weber Waller, Taking Pop-Ups Seriously: The Jurisprudence of the Infield Fly
Rule, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 453 (2004); Vaughn R. Walker, Moving the Strike Zone: How Judges Sometimes Make
Law, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207.
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decision. Both subjects essentially concern the search for two illusive qualities: a structure to the
analysis that avoids the appearance of mindless whimsy, and a foundation that makes the
structure universally applicable rather than idiosyncratic. All lawyers and judges seek to claim
that their thinking and conclusions are not chaotic and arbitrary, but patterned, coherent, and
constrained, and hence, worthy of respect. One rudimentary form that this effort takes is the
commonplace observation that legal reasoning is basically about consistency—“treating like
cases alike, and different cases differently.” 12 However, that rubric merely describes the
challenge rather than resolve it. The important question is how the legal mind, judicial or
otherwise, attempts to identify relevant, meaningful resemblances and distinctions, and hence
how it believes it justifies its arguments and conclusions beyond simple assertion itself.
The discussion below of lawyering, judging, and umpiring—of the search within all of
them for arguments and conclusions that are grounded, thorough, and credible—is divided into
five sections. Part I sets the stage by contending that legal reasoning can best be understood as
both multi-dimensional and multi-layered: The legal mind must confront a host of challenging
dichotomies that split the thought process into competing perspectives, each potentially
appropriate, but each also the basis for disagreement. This section establishes an analytic
framework that will allow us to appreciate and organize our challenges. It structures this
daunting mental process, describing in detail the multiple rhetorical strategies available to legal
advocates, and in turn the special difficulty facing judges and umpires alike. As that framework
has four segments—that is, four different forms of division and blending 13— Parts II-V develop
each in turn. Considered as a whole, we have, in effect, a map of legal argumentation—whether
for attack, defense, or resolution—which Professor Gould’s essay so admirably reflects. The last
of these sections, Part V, will focus on the singular anxiety and pressure imposed on those who
must make close calls, legal or otherwise, and will revisit in some detail the differences between
the visions of decision making of Professor Gould and Chief Justice Roberts. 14

12

This phrase is ubiquitous in legal contexts, but one of its most thoughtful discussions appears in H.L.A. Hart’s
classic work, The Concept of Law. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 159 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz
eds., 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HART].
13
One might get the impression that these multiple perspectives yield little more than a chaotic mess. To the
contrary, however, this article will argue that legal reasoning is inevitably, and healthily, quite complicated.
Complexity does not necessarily entail disorder and turmoil.
14
What one will not find in this essay, however, is a detailed review of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinions over the
years he has served as a judge. We shall focus in Part VI.C, infra, only on a few of his decisions written while he
was on the Court of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. A wider review of his work is beyond the scope of this article
for three reasons.
First, Professor Gould’s essay and Chief Justice Roberts’s comment at his confirmation hearing limit the
direct comparison of their approaches to decision-making to a particular kind of case: one in which a single concept,
like a “strike,” is the central point on which a decision will turn. To broaden the analysis to all aspects of Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinions would therefore be unfair to him and off-point here.
Second, we will focus on Court of Appeals decisions because they are more analogous to that of an umpire’s
call than would be Supreme Court opinions, which would be more akin to decisions by the Commissioner of
Baseball. The best comparison, of course, would be between an umpire and a district or trial court, but Chief Justice
Roberts never served at that judicial level.
Third, using then-Judge Roberts’s Court of Appeals decisions for the D.C. Circuit allows us to contrast his
approach more directly with the reasoning of another judge who served on that same Court—Judge J. Skelly
Wright—which we will do in Part IV, see infra text accompanying notes 63-89.
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II. LEGAL REASONING: THE CLASSICS AND A NEW APPROACH
Because the slippery concept of “context,” in various forms and guises will be important
to the analysis of both Gould’s essay (where it is invoked and relied upon explicitly) and the
remarkably broad and complex topic of legal reasoning, this article, then, should correspondingly
place itself within a similarly appropriate background that will give us some perspective on the
framework to be suggested. That is more of a challenge, however, than might otherwise be
assumed, simply because the topic of legal reasoning, as a general proposition, has been
examined countless times by numerous scholars in many ways. Yet legal reasoning itself, as a
target of focused interest, has actually very seldom been carefully studied and unpacked. Within
this literature, however, a few analytic efforts have become somewhat paradigmatic—points of
departure for the rest of us, as it were. Subpart A below thus provides a first, very summary step
to establishing this foundation by noting the primary, classic commentaries on legal reasoning,
and identifying their principal shared themes. The picture that emerges, however—multi-hued
though it is—will still be incomplete, and hence unsatisfying. Subpart B will then suggest an
alternative framework, which will in turn animate the remainder of this Article.
A. Legal Reasoning: The Common Traditional Themes
Most summaries of the phenomenon of legal reasoning—as opposed to the closely related,
but not identical, topic of “what is law” 15 —would probably begin with a reference to Karl
Llewellyn and his “bramble bush,” 16 then pay homage to the very careful examination of
practical lawyering in the materials developed by Hart and Sacks, 17 then make reference to the
short but insightful summary of legal reasoning developed for lawyer and non-lawyer audiences
alike by Edward Levi, 18 certainly include a discussion of the debate between H.L.A. Hart 19 and
Ronald Dworkin, 20 perhaps go so far as to note the interconnection between legal “rights” and
legal “remedies” developed by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed in their justly famous
work in law-and-economics, 21 note as well the thoughtful commentary by Steven Burton, 22 and
15

The difference here can be imagined thus: Assume that future astronauts discover a population of aliens on Mars,
and you are hired to investigate whether this society has “law.” What would you investigate? What would you look
for? The best summary of what that exercise would entail probably continues to be the traditional positivist analysis
employed by Professor Hart in The Concept of Law. See HART, supra note 12.
16
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (Quid Pro Books 2012) (1930).
17
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958). See also
WILLIAM R. BISHIN & CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
LEGAL METHOD (1972).
18
EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949).
19
See HART, supra note 12.
20
Although Professor Dworkin has discussed the work of Professor Hart in various places, the most extended direct
analysis and criticism of his work appears in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-130 (1978)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY], where, as one of his commentary techniques, he contrasts the
judicial efforts of hypothetical judges named “Herbert,” the positivist (guess what the “H” in H.L.A. Hart stands
for), and “Hercules,” the anti-positivist. See infra text accompanying notes 86-87.
21
Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). I will confess here that the absence of a discussion of this work in the
context of an article on legal reasoning is a significant deficit, but it is beyond the scope of what can usefully be
developed here. The point of the “Property Rules” article was not simply that economic principles were relevant to
legal analysis—it was more profound. The observation that these authors made was that the law in at least one
substantive area—nuisance law, and tort law more generally—could be understood much more accurately and
usefully if one separated the “rights” that might determine who should “win” in a given case from the “remedy” that
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conclude, perhaps, by reviewing the remarkably ambitious and insightful series of articles by
Frederick Schauer. 23 These sources 24 are so frequently referenced in part because they share
three crucial perspectives that have come to be associated with all discussions of legal reasoning.
First, and most fundamentally, each of these sources preaches the message that studying
the phenomenon of legal reasoning is interesting and important not because it is an inquiry into
the process for discovering and establishing some underlying “truth,” the way scientific method
attempts to do, but instead because it examines how to appreciate and operate within a realm
where fundamental truth is absent—where all conclusions remain contingent and challengeable,
and “discretion” is unavoidable. Each emphasizes, disconcertingly to the uninitiated, that the
study of law is something that changes as it is being studied. Professor Levi perhaps puts the
proposition most directly: “Therefore it appears that the kind of reasoning involved in the legal
process is one in which the classification changes as the classification is made. The rules change
as the rules are applied. More important, the rules arise out of a process which, while comparing
fact situations, creates the rules and then applies them.” 25
Yet, as a second critical theme in the midst of this unsettling picture, each classic source
enjoys this status because it is simultaneously committed to the idea that this malleable process
of legal reasoning is not infinitely manipulable, with no form and content. Instead, legal
reasoning is presented as following certain identifiable, rational, and widely accepted patterns of
analysis and decision making. After all, the topic here is labeled legal “reasoning” rather than
legal “goofiness” or legal “arbitrariness.”

will be employed to manifest that “win.” Thus, as they demonstrated, cases were decided quite differently depending
on whether a victory by one party resulted in the extreme imposition of an injunction (which they labeled a
“property rule”) that stopped or imposed an action completely (like shutting down a polluting factory), or it resulted
in the less painful sanction of damages (which they called a “liability rule”). As a matter of economic theory, the key
to this differentiation was that the former remedy would force the loser in a case, if the loser wanted to change the
outcome, to pay the winner’s price, whatever that might be; the latter remedy instead allowed the court to set the
price.
But more generally (and fundamentally) concerning legal reasoning, the separation between “rights” and
“remedies” speaks directly to the decision-maker’s context, as the issue of a “strike” illustrates as well as any. The
“remedy” of calling a pitch a “strike” could be made more or less onerous than the current rule of calling the player
“out”: It could be that this batter would be required to do ten push-ups before attempting to swing at another pitch;
or it could be that the batter is thrown out of the game altogether. The point is that the “rule” of the strike zone
cannot really be appreciated without reference to what will happen once a decision is made—how serious, nasty,
unalterable, or unreviewable the result may be. Unfortunately, we will put all of that interesting nuance aside as we
compare the baseball metaphor employed by Professor Gould and Chief Justice Roberts.
22
STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING (Aspen Publishers, 3d ed. 2007).
23
In these articles he explores in detail his depiction of the sequence of analytic steps that produces the complex
matrix of the common law. Fredrick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985); Fredrick Schauer,
Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985); Fredrick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987) [hereinafter
Schauer, Precedent]; Fredrick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (1991). Frederick Schauer, Giving
Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995); Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455 (1995). But
this short list, long as it seems, is only a small portion of an immense body of work that stretches to the present,
further exploring and interrelating these concepts.
24
Some may complain that missing from this list is a reference to Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (1964). This is
indeed an important and impressive classic as well, but its agenda is much more the (necessary) connection between
law and morality, rather than the nature of legal reasoning itself. Nevertheless, Professor Fuller’s concern with an
“inner” morality of law is certainly relevant to the discussion of “hypertext” that is developed later in this essay, see
infra pp. 17, 36-41, so I put his work aside with all due reverence.
25
LEVI, supra note 18, at 3-4.
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Two important points follow from this simple observation. One is that this Article’s
analysis of legal reasoning will not explore in depth what is labeled the “critical” approach to
assessing legal material. 26 Although to summarize this school is always dangerous, one of its
distinctive characteristics is the belief “that no distinctive mode of legal reasoning exists to be
contrasted with political dialogue. . . . Law is not so much a rational enterprise as a vast exercise
in rationalization.” 27 The classic sources emphatically disagree, distilling instead from the words
and actions of judges certain patterns of reasoning that are legitimate and appropriate for the
context of the law. Although more (but not much more) will be said later about the relationship
of critical scholarship to the analytic form suggested here, 28 it needs to be acknowledged that the
critical approach does not play a significant role in the development of this Article’s thesis.
A second point follows from the search for legitimate forms of reasoning. The classic
commentaries identify within case-based law in particular certain analytic techniques appropriate
to fluid circumstances: the use of analogy, deductive and inductive reasoning, and theories of
language. 29 Despite these regularizing forms, however, a conundrum always remains: Careful
application of these patterns and accepted techniques will not produce specific, singular,
“proven” outcomes, but rather results that seem legitimate in an analytic sense yet remain
controversial. The critical scholars are therefore correct, but exaggerate the point, when they
claim that “[l]egal doctrine can be manipulated to justify an almost infinite spectrum of possible
outcomes.” 30 For the classic sources on legal reasoning, it is not the outcomes that matter, but the
process: Fundamentally, legal reasoning exists, and must be studied, not because it produces
legal or social agreement, but because it is the method by which we manage disagreement.
This connection of legal theory to dispute management is most evident, perhaps, when the
inquiry turns more pragmatically (largely from the influence of Professor Dworkin) into a search
for a “theory of adjudication,” 31 or how judges can legitimately resolve so-called “hard
cases” 32 —cases that lack a clear and uncontroversial legal rule that would easily settle the
matter. And in turn, this kind of legal theory demonstrates how a skillful legal advocate can
26

The literature associated with the so-called “critical legal studies” movement is both vast and varied. Among
many summary discussions, a good one appears in ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR., NANCY LEVIT & RICHARD DELGADO,
JURISPRUDENCE: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNISM 402-460 (Jean
Stefancic ed., 2d ed. 2002).
27
Allan C. Hutchison & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama
of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 206 (1984). This article is part of a wide-ranging symposium
collection in this volume of the Stanford Law Review.
28
See infra text accompanying note 50.
29
See BURTON, supra note 22, at 25 (“Legal reasoning takes two principal forms: One is analogical; the other is
deductive.”); id. at 27 (“Analogical legal reasoning is not fundamentally different from analogical reasoning in
familiar situations. It is, however, more formal, rigorous, and uniform in its expression.”); id. at 46; (“Deductive
legal reasoning, like its analogical cousin, is more formal and rigorous than similar reasoning in most everyday nonlegal contexts.”); see also LEVI, supra note 18, at 1-2 (“The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example.
It is reasoning from case to case. It is a three-step process described by the doctrine of precedent in which a
proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law and then applied to a next similar situation. The
steps are these: similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case is announced; then the
rule of law is made applicable in the second case.”) (citation omitted). On matters of language, the best sources
would be HART, supra note 12, at 18-20, 124-136, and BISHIN & STONE, supra note 17, at 403-538.
30
Hutchison & Monahan, supra note 27, at 206.
31
This approach was announced in Taking Rights Seriously, see DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note
20, at viii, 1-13, but has been a constant theme throughout Professor Dworkin’s work, including Matter of Principle
(1985), Law’s Empire (1986), and Justice in Robes (2006).
32
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 20, at 81-130.
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create a “hard” case out of what might otherwise appear simple legal circumstances. In this
frequently encountered context, in addition to the various forms of reasoning noted above, the
literature has developed and analyzed at length the distinctions between and among various
theories that blend and merge an approach to thinking with an understanding of what may
legitimately be thought about: for example, realism, 33 positivism, 34 anti-positivism (or
interpretivism), 35 formalism, 36 rule-skepticism, 37 and so on.
Certainly the differences among these camps are important to an understanding of law and
legal systems. In particular, for example, one critical insight into a lawyer’s thought process is
Professor Dworkin’s distinction between narrow, objective legal “rules,” on the one hand, and
broad, abstract, normative legal “principles,” on the other. 38 But the key point for present
purposes is the third classic element within the legal reasoning literature that arises in this
context: the acknowledgement that the distinctions between these legal theories are driven in
major part by differing views concerning the relevance of values to the resolution of a matter,
whether those be a person’s own personal values, or larger social policies, or any other form of
normative contingency. The questions that positivists, anti-positivists, and so on at least
acknowledge, but answer quite differently, are, for example: To what extent can judges consider
such value-based perspectives in deciding a case? To what extent, then, can lawyers legitimately
argue these perspectives to a judge? What sorts of values can appropriately be considered by a
judge in contested legal matters, and which are inappropriate? And why?
I will not argue here that any of the several approaches to resolving these kinds of
questions in the existing literature on legal theory and legal reasoning is “wrong” to any
significant extent. Instead, my contention is that they are all to one degree or another incomplete.
I seek to be both more detailed and structured in my analysis of legal reasoning, and thus present
a more comprehensive catalogue of analytic strategies available in legal argument and judicial
decision making. Consequently, much of the detail in other work, and the details of the
disagreements among the authors, can be put aside, for we will attempt to go “underneath” this

33

This genre could just as easily today be labeled as “pragmatist”—the effort to connect legal results to our actual
experiences and practical expectations. One classic statement within this genre is Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930), but examples abound.
34
To put it in its simplest form, the basic notion within this school is that claims about “law” must be rooted in some
“positive,” objective background source, such as a statute or court decision, rather than more amorphous
possibilities like a society’s sense of “morality.” The most well-known and well-regarded statement of this approach
continues to be The Concept of Law, see HART, supra note 12.
35
Most directly associated with the work of Ronald Dworkin, this kind of legal theory rejects any separation (rigid
or otherwise) between law and the contextual morality within which it operates. See generally RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE]. In his later work, Professor Dworkin would refer to
his anti-positivism theories as “interpretivism.” See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 249 (2006).
36
This label basically derives from the emphasis on the demands of formal logic: major premises entail the minor,
and reasoning leads wherever this process may take you. Law therefore looks a lot like mathematics, with selfreferential proofs, and very narrow understandings of the reach of “rules.” An excellent discussion of this approach
appears in The Concept of Law, HART, supra note 12, at 124-54.
37
As an analytic matter, this approach is the opposite of formalism—it rejects the idea that an anchoring, narrow
postulate lies in the background of any rule. Instead, law is an exercise in ambiguity and vagueness, with the only
certainty being the ruling of an authoritative decision-maker. Hence, we are back to the realists. Hart’s book is also a
useful source on this topic, and its relation to formalism. See HART, supra note 12.
38
This has been a major theme in Professor Dworkin’s work, but it began (in book form at least) in Taking Rights
Seriously. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 20, at 22-28, 71-80.
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discussion to even more basic questions about how lawyers reason about analogies or rules or
principles or values or anything else they might claim is relevant to their contentions. 39

39

The issue for us is not the fact that analogies are used, or that inductive or deductive reasoning is displayed, but
how those analogies work, and which generalities or particulars are the beginning points for the thought process, and
why: Do the analogies and other forms of reasoning depend on texts or on values or on references to practical
circumstances or what?
A good example of the difference between the approach in prior literature and the tack taken here is the
description of legal reasoning developed by Professor Schauer. Although it is always dangerous to summarize a
nuanced study of a topic this abstract, Professor Schauer’s argument basically reduces to an observation that a
judicial decision links to others through a series of three mental exercises: The legal mind “characterizes” the
problem at hand, then “compares” the current matter to existing legal authority within that context, and then
“assimilates” the new decision into that context. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 23, at 576-77. (It is not as if these
steps occur in this rigorous order, of course, but they are all going to have to be made, see id. at 577, 589.) In effect,
the effort is to connect this new case to all three temporal perspectives: the past—the preexisting contexts that have
been recognized as appropriate perspectives or categories of legal thought; the present—the relationship of the
current case to those existing categories; and then the future—the way the new case is perceived to impact the way
life (legal and otherwise) will be led in light of the new decision. Professor Schauer does not contend, however, that
these steps are necessarily taken in this order, or that each is somehow rigidly separated from the others. They blend,
as he explains:
Reasoning from precedent, whether looking back to the past or ahead to the future, presupposes an
ability to identify the relevant precedent. Why does a currently contemplated decision sometimes
have a precedent and sometimes not? Such a distinction can exist only if there is some way of
identifying a precedent—some way of determining whether a past event is sufficiently similar to
the present facts to justify assimilation of the two events. And when we think about precedential
effect in the future of the action we take today, we presuppose that some future events will be
descriptively assimilated to today’s.
Id. at 576-77.
What we need, then, is an “organizing standard specifying which similarities are important and which we can
safely ignore,” id. at 577, what he calls “rules of relevance,” id. at 578. In turn, these rules will “be explained as a
choice among alternative characterizations,” id. at 579, and these characterizations will be viewed with reference to
assimilation as the spin “the future . . . will place [on] today’s facts,” id. And, as you would expect, the question then
becomes whether there are any “rules” of assimilation as well—that is, preexisting categories of some sort “in the
larger consciousness surrounding the particular decisionmaking individual or institution” that constrain or direct that
activity as well. Id. at 585.
This is a complex and interesting picture of thinking within the context of legal issues, and it can be seen at
work, in a way, in Gould’s analysis of Pinelli’s called third strike. The “characterization,” or category, at stake might
be simply that of baseball’s traditional, physical understanding of a “strike,” or it might instead be “a strike in a big
game toward the end of a spectacular effort by a pitcher.” Which category is chosen depends on how we compare
the game in question to the games of the past, and that assessment may or may not support this distinction between
the two categories. And the category we choose, and the comparison we make, will also depend on how we assess
the impact the “strike” call will have on the game of baseball as it will be played in the future.
There is nothing wrong or inaccurate about the depiction of reasoning being presented here. We can accept
all of it, but then ask additional questions: Is there more that might be said about this process? Are there more
precise ways of capturing the “categorizing,” “comparing,” and “assimilating” that no doubt seem to be occurring
within the legal mind? Can we identify, in other words, the typical analytic strategies that lawyers (and more
generally, all very careful thinkers) use “underneath” Professor Schauer’s steps? In a way, we are trying to
determine what the “rules” of relevance and assimilation might be that guide (or perhaps warp, depending on your
point of view) the legal reasoning process. Can we articulate how the categorizing, and so on, unfolds in a particular
lawyer or judge’s mind so that we can compare and contrast that thought process to the thinking of others? Professor
Schauer does not seem to believe so, for at one point he observes that “the rules of precedent are likely to resemble
the rules of language—a series of practices not substantially reducible to specifics.” Id. at 595.
Here I disagree. Although “specifics” in the sense of “precise” maps of analytical process may well be
impossible, “specifics” in terms of additional structure within that process is quite possible.
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While this inquiry will necessarily be at a high level of abstraction, the analytic focus will
still remain, as it primarily did for these classic sources, on the most basic, and initial, conceptual
hurdle confronted by all new law students concerning “legal reasoning”: the structure and nature
of “typical” judicial thinking, and hence of legal argumentation more generally. I want to
determine whether there is anything special about that mental activity—whether the concept of
“thinking like a lawyer” has any identifiable content and predictable structure that could then be
used by lawyers to their advantage in assessing the contentions thrown at them by adversaries or
judges.
I believe there is in fact something rather special about legal reasoning in particular 40 that
deserves to be identified and appreciated for the range of insights it provides about the challenge
of judicial decision making that Gould’s article about Umpire Pinelli is meant to illustrate.
Indeed, I would argue that this deeper examination of reasoning is also quite necessary as a
matter of both legal and political theory: The question that lies beneath all the classic sources on
legal reasoning is quite simply why, in the first instance, are there so many competing sources?
Why—with so many smart people doing this analytic work so regularly and for so long—do
lawyers and judges nevertheless continue to disagree so profoundly about appropriate outcomes
in so many cases? We can understand that litigants (and by extension their lawyers) will disagree
simply because they have competing interests they wish to vindicate by any means at their
disposal. But why do judges disagree, when presumably they do not have a personal motive to do
so? 41 Why does social consensus develop so grudgingly, if it develops at all? Carefully
examined, one can discover that disagreement on issues of law and public policy are in fact
inevitable and intractable—not because of some sinister conspiracy, but because the process of
analyzing the issues at stake is itself so fractured. 42
40

One of Professor Schauer’s final conclusions about the process of legal reasoning might appear to be directly
inconsistent with the thesis motivating this Article: At one point he rejects “the view that a theory of law must
identify some form of thinking or decision making unique to legal institutions.” Id. at 603. Yet that proposition,
properly understood, is not at all inconsistent with the analytic argument being made here. The conceptual matrix
proposed in the next subsection is not “necessary” to a theory of law—it does not attempt to justify any particular
view of our legal institutions. Instead, the matrix is an explanatory theory of legal reasoning: It is a “useful,”
pragmatic tool for understanding, and anticipating, any argument about what “the law” might be in any given case.
This analytic theory will also therefore not be “unique” to legal institutions, in the sense that no other decision
makers employ it; instead, it will be more modestly a claim about what is quite “characteristic” of the way
thoughtful lawyers and judges assess their professional circumstances.
41
Disagreement—often vociferous—among dedicated, well-informed, experts has always intrigued me, and has
been a motivating factor in several articles I have published. See, e.g., Timothy P. Terrell, Turmoil at the Normative
Core of Lawyering: Uncomfortable Lessons from the “Metaethics” of Legal Ethics, 49 EMORY L. J. 87 (2000)
[hereinafter Terrell, Turmoil]; Timothy P. Terrell, Statutory Epistemology: Mapping the Interpretation Debate, 53
EMORY L. J. 523, 524 (2004) [hereinafter Terrell, Epistemology].
42
Another example of the unfortunate, but inevitable, “incompleteness” of the analysis of legal reasoning presented
in this article is a further step that will be only mentioned briefly here. One element of appropriate legal reasoning is
that a lawyer be “thorough” in analyzing whatever must be considered. The claim I am defending here is that a
“thorough” understanding of the law will require more analytic steps than most other situations of study.
For example, imagine that you ask an environmental scientist to give you a thorough understanding of a
“river.” You would probably get a discussion from her that would start with the most obvious “surface” aspects of
the course of moving water, but then she would note the nature of the land that contains and defines the river’s
course, the varying depths and widths of the water along the course, the varying chemical composition of the water
or the sediments within it, the life forms within the water, the life forms that surround and are nurtured by this water,
perhaps a discourse on the economic importance of the river to the larger community near the river, and so on.
Despite this impressive array of information, notice how none of it is abstractly normative or philosophical—it is all
well-organized objective data.
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Although some law students seem to take this observation as one of cynicism and despair,
it is not. It is, quite the contrary, a message of professional opportunity.
B. A Structured Alternative: The Law’s “Text” Gives Way to Context, Hypertext, and Subtext
The model of legal reasoning suggested here has four interrelated segments, each of which
contains in turn its own special “split analytic personality.” Together, they produce a
diagrammatic map of this special, complex, and quite challenging, mental process. 43 As a
heuristic device, the diagram below uses the most obvious manifestation of the law—its words,
or “text”—as the taxonomical touchstone:

Or imagine that you asked a psychologist to give you a thorough understanding of a “person.” This might be
a bit more challenging, as the discussion would quickly move from the superficial, readily observable characteristics
of skin and hair color, height and weight, and the like—for we are certainly more than just “flesh and bones”—to
background elements of ethnicity, birthplace, age, life experiences, test results showing various aptitudes or
limitations, and so on. More and more detail would produce what seems to be a “complete” picture of any human
being, but again in an objective, data-based way. Any abstraction about the nature or importance or character of this
person would make the psychologist begin to squirm.
Both these categories—river and person—are essentially and largely anchored in tangibility—something
identifiable and familiar. What happens, though, if the topic to be developed is itself only an abstraction, with at best
slender connections to anything concrete?
What, for example, is “property”—what can you “own”? What is a “contract”? What is a “crime”? What is
“personal jurisdiction”? What is “income”? What is a “security interest”? What is a “reasonable person”? These are
all concepts—they are mental constructs that summarize and embody in a word a host of constituent elements lying
in the background. Certainly “river” and “person” are similarly composed of numerous definitional pieces, but the
constituent elements of the legal concepts are themselves abstractions: How do you know when you have sufficient
“agreement” to create a “contract”? If we need “consideration” for this contract, what is that? And so on.
The challenge of legal reasoning in particular—to understand concepts thoroughly—is therefore the need to
handle effectively this peculiar kind of information that involves the layering of abstraction on top of abstraction.
Although the analysis of any term—“river,” “person,” or anything else—will need a structure of some sort to make
it comprehensible, the conceptual context of the law will require more attention to this structure than we are
accustomed to applying. Even something as seemingly mundane and ordinary as a “strike,” because it is a purely
human construct invented for a special regulatory context, will be a daunting proposition to pin down.
What, then, is the nature of this “conceptual analysis” that lies at the heart of legal reasoning? Here is where
the unique form of multi-dimensional structure developed in this article comes into play.
43
Anyone familiar with the literature on legal reasoning will note, of course, that the analysis here is a structured
approach to the concept of “narrative” that has become so important to discussions of the nature of precedent.
Professor Robert Cover was particularly poetic in his summary of the phenomenon: “Narratives are models through
which we study and experience transformations that result when a given simplified state of affairs is made to pass
through the force field of a similarly simplified set of norms.” Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1983). For him, law and narrative were “inseparably
related.” Id. at 5.
I would make this point in the following form, captured in the article’s diagram. The qualities of “structure”
and “foundation” noted in the text are developed by lawyers not simply by amassing “information” of one sort or
another, but assessing a daunting form of information organized by and around multiple (and layered) abstract
concepts, represented in the diagram. That circumstance demands a special analytic facility of several parts—and, to
make matters even worse, those parts may indeed conflict and compete with each other.
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TEXT
• The structure of language:
The “is/ought” split

CONTEXT

HYPERTEXT

• The structure of circumstances:
The “micro/macro” split

• The structure of normativity:
The “categorical/consequential” split

SUBTEXT
• The structure of political institutional
relations: The “judicial/legislative” split

As this Article will explain, each of these elements is fundamental to any society’s effort to
identify and justify the guidance that its legal system is presumed to provide, both to ordinary
citizens and official decision makers, within its political context. In addition, each element is
invoked in and relevant to Gould’s article.
The vertical order of the elements depicted Figure 1 is only tangentially an aspect of the
analytic argument to be made. Although “text” is at the top of the diagram, and is ordinarily
assumed to be the starting point for traditional legal analysis, 44 it is not necessarily “primary” in
an analytical sense. The examination of a particular legal controversy—in a lawyer’s brief or in a
court’s opinion—may well not emphasize the language used to describe or express it. Indeed, the
double-pointed arrows that appear throughout Figure 1 indicate that each segment of this analytic
approach is simultaneously related to all the others. Nevertheless, the contention of the diagram
is that the nuances of language will inevitably and unavoidably play some role in the full
consideration of that controversy. By the same token, although language does not “precede”
society’s moral and social values, nevertheless the ways in which society attempts to capture and
express our values in the medium of language—our effort to communicate values—is intimately
connected to the substance of our normativity. “Sequence” within the diagram is therefore not
the point. The key is the distinction between and among these analytical elements. Despite the
fact that each segment influences all the others, they are each separate and distinct enough from
each other to deserve explicit attention. Appreciating each analytical element on its own terms
leads to a more useful understanding of the craft of legal reasoning—even though, in the end,
they all do mush together.

44

See, e.g., Eva H. HANKS, MICHAEL E. HERZ & STEVEN S. NEMERSON, ELEMENTS OF LAW 282 (2d ed. 2010),
which observes that in statutory interpretation this is “commonplace.” But this description is not at all limited to that
context. Any analysis resting in language must necessarily start with an acknowledgement of that language.
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Subsequent sections of this Article below will develop in more detail each of the pieces of
the diagram, and hence each particular “split personality” generating consternation within its
arena. For now, they can be summarized as follows:
Text: Law and legal systems are essentially efforts to regulate human conduct. This effort
travels on the basis of the language used to express those regulations. Thus, any study of law
must pay particular attention to the nature of language as our medium for embodying social
guidance. In the case of Gould’s article, the disconcerting example is the single word—and
critical concept—of a “strike.” It is an apt illustration of that most basic of philosophical
distinctions resting at the core of linguistics: the difference between the way in which a word is
in fact used by a population, and the way in which the word should be used, according to some
preexisting criteria or normative agenda. 45 These linguistic elements in turn simply reflect the
distinction that the philosopher David Hume 46 urged us to make: between “is” (facts, loosely
understood) and “ought” (values, largely understood).
Context: Language, in the form of regulation, necessarily applies within shifting
circumstances. Thus, the question becomes whether this kind of contextual contingency can and
should make a difference—to our language, to our values, or to various institutional players in
the analysis of a matter. And how much difference will we permit this shift in circumstance to
make? For Gould, this struggle is captured in the importance he affords context-based “truth”
and its relationship to linguistic messiness: Being in the realm of the World Series somehow
causes a definitional shift. For lawyers and judges, this is the realm of “categorization” and
“comparison” that Professor Schauer emphasizes, where the legal mind assesses situations by
examining possible similarities and differences. The issue for our analysis of legal reasoning is
whether the activities of labeling, relating, and distinguishing regularly fall into identifiable
analytic subsets. They do. The most obvious will be the differing circumstances of “facts” and
“legal categories,” but more fundamentally and subtly will be the impact of differences in

45

The point is not, of course, that these two elements are separate and distinct; instead, they interact with and
influence each other. For example:
If I attempt to retell a funny story which I have heard, the story as I tell it will be the product of
two forces: (1) the story as I heard it, the story as it is at the time of its first telling; (2) my
conception of the point of the story, in other words, my notion of the story as it ought to be. As I
retell the story I make no attempt to estimate exactly the pressure of these two forces, though it is
clear that their respective influences may vary. If the story as I heard it was, in my opinion, badly
told, I am guided largely by my conception of the story as it ought to be, though through inertia or
imperfect insight I shall probably repeat turns of phrase which have stuck in my memory from the
former telling. On the other hand, if I had the story from the master raconteur, I may exert myself
to reproduce his exact words, though my own conception of the way the story ought to be told will
have to fill in the gaps left by faulty memory. These two forces, then, supplement one another in
shaping the story as I tell it. It is a product of the is and the ought working together.
LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 8 (1966).
46
1 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 302 (David F. Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 2007) (1740) (“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the
author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes
observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations
of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This
change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some
new relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a
reason shou’d be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from
others, which are entirely different from it.”)
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“scale” in the inquiry: from the “micro” (or moral) context of particular individuals in singular
circumstances, to the “macro” (or political) context of larger populations in general situations. 47
Hypertext: Neither text nor context, however, just “happen”—the words we decide to
employ and the circumstances that somehow actually matter to us must be explained and
justified: They become the “right” words and the “correct” social contingency to which to refer.
We (meaning lawyers and judges) demand reasons, which require reference to the values we
believe make our choice of language and circumstances appropriate. We must, in other words, at
this stage become straightforwardly normative. Gould makes forays into this philosophical realm
with his references to “justice” and “democracy,” and, by unspoken implication, their relevance
to concepts of community, political theory, and law. But his essay is tantalizing in part because it
says so little on these critical points. Nevertheless, Gould’s defense of Pinelli’s call reflects a
fundamental distinction that legal reasoning regularly makes between two forms of normative
analysis: on the one hand, “categorical” (or deontological) thinking, and, on the other,
“consequential” (or teleological) assessments. 48
Subtext: As a final step, to fully appreciate the relevance of Gould’s essay to the world of
legal reasoning, all these factors of language, circumstances, and values must be understood to
intersect and integrate within a particular context that will put them into proper practical
perspective: the political—meaning the operative governing—institutions within which efforts to
regulate human conduct will take place. We must appreciate who makes and applies the rules,
whether of baseball or the law, and the relationships between these actors. Although this topic
could stretch quite far—from legislatures to court decisions prompted by litigation to private
contracts creating special relationships, and beyond—the more immediate focus here for
purposes of appreciating Gould’s essay is limited to the arbitrators of disputes within situations
of rule-governed activity: For Gould, the central political actor is his fabled baseball umpire. For
law more generally, we will need to expand to a vision and theory of judging in the context of a
complex circumstance of multiple centers of regulatory authority. But Gould nevertheless
supplies an interesting bridge between these two realms, I will argue, in his essay’s last two
words. 49

47

See, e.g., Terrell, Turmoil, supra note 41, at 100-101.
Id. at 102-05.
49
Perhaps, for the sake of completeness, I should note that these diagrammatic interrelationships are an extension of
an earlier picture of legal reasoning I developed in an article that summarized this analytic process around the
“dimensions” of our thinking. In Timothy P. Terrell, Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of Legal Reasoning and
the Development of Fundamental Normative Principles, 72 CAL. L. REV. 288 (1984), I observed that law students
early in their education proceed quickly from an assumption that “the law” is an array of isolated, dimensionless
“points” of authority, to an additional awareness that many points in fact connect with each other to form something
akin to one-dimensional “strings” of propositions or “lines” of authority that characterize the development of a more
broadly applicable legal rule. This stage is in turn supplemented by a more professionally sophisticated
understanding that these “lines” in fact form themselves into two-dimensional “shapes” that pull together an image
of an entire area of legal doctrine, like “contract law” or “tort law” and so on. Hence, students arrive in the
traditional legal world of “flatlaw.” Eventually, however, with a good legal education, these “shapes” of the law
become more complex three-dimensional objects, as legal doctrine is placed within wider interdisciplinary contexts.
At this stage, the law becomes only one slice (among many) of a larger, richer reality: Tort law, for example, is
studied as a reflection of economic theory or as a means of vindicating human dignity or as a function of any
number of other perspectives. The law, then, rather than being a subject isolated unto itself—a “closed” analytic
system like mathematics—is understood more profoundly as a complex function of a wide range of human concerns.
The diagram suggested above is quite consistent with this earlier dimensional depiction of legal reasoning.
Two-dimensional thinking corresponds essentially to putting the law into a “context,” while three-dimensional
48
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A final preliminary comment about the segments of the diagram: By setting aside the
“critical legal” approach, the list does not include a super-category that might overlay the entire
exercise: “pretext.” One could believe that legal reasoning is, as noted earlier, 50 a sham—it is
simply political power dressed up for public consumption. Unfortunately, those who proceed
from this assumption cannot be persuaded otherwise by the legion of examples to the contrary
that demonstrate, to my satisfaction at least, conscientious people doggedly pursuing what they
believe to be the public good, rather than social domination. 51 So I will not attempt to engage in
that fight. I will, I admit, assume that the process of legal reasoning is psychologically legitimate,
and the job here will be to identify its operative elements.
The final picture of that process will indeed be complex. This is not my fault. It is a
function of the fact that none of the elements of legal reasoning exists in isolation from any
other—they intersect and overlap and generally influence each other. Although the result is
complicated, the message here, as noted earlier, is not one of despair, but of quite practical
opportunity. Using Gould’s essay, we can demonstrate and appreciate the subtle methods used
by astute lawyers to listen carefully to the arguments of others and identify weak spots available
for exploitation. It is a lesson, then, in learning how to organize effective arguments and
counterarguments in the special world of law and public policy.
But first, however, it is a lesson more simply in how to think like, and hence argue
effectively with, an umpire.
III. THE CHALLENGE OF TEXT: THE “IS” AND “OUGHT” OF “STRIKES,” AND THE ART OF
UMPIRING
A. Language, Set Theory, and the Inevitable Connections to Other Analytic Dimensions
Nothing is more basic to the game of baseball than the “balls” and “strikes” that
constitute the competitive relationship between pitcher and batter from which everything else in
the game flows. But what does Gould consider a “strike” to be? Clearly it includes any pitch that
he wants to be a strike for some personal reason. But less arbitrarily, how does he “know” this
pitch was a strike? On what, besides his own agenda, does he base his assertion that Don
Larson’s pitch was “a strike, high and outside”?
As an initial matter, Gould must be congratulated for acknowledging that the fabled final
pitch was indeed a bad one. Strong evidence—more than just Dale Mitchell’s grumbling—
establishes the point. Every year at World Series time a film of that pitch taken from a camera
above and behind home plate is telecast as part of the usual ritual of anticipation. The purpose of
the repeated showing is not, of course, to reexamine the moment critically, but to join in the
Yankees’ celebration of that unique, historic perfect game. Nevertheless, the film quite clearly
shows that the pitch was well outside the “technical” strike zone, as Gould refers to it. But
thinking brings “hypertext” into play. The exercise here is to engage in a yet deeper examination of the nature of the
connections that create the lines, shapes, and objects that the law forms metaphorically in our minds.
50
See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
51
Of the many responses to and assessments of the Critical Legal Studies movement, a few interesting examples
would include: Jerry L. Anderson, Law School Enters the Matrix: Teaching Critical Legal Studies, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 201, 202 (2004) (“worthless concepts”); Jonathan Turley, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to CLS, Unger, and Deep
Thought, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 593 (1987) (wide-ranging review); Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Telling
Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (criticism aimed particularly at
the CLS technique of attacking legal doctrine through micro-stories).
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somehow, despite that evidence and Gould’s apparent acceptance of it, the pitch was a legitimate
“strike.” How can the term “strike” be so easily and egregiously manipulated?
One conclusion—very widely accepted in our postmodern 52 world, in which everything
is considered contingent and foundationless—could simply be that language is a human construct
meant to be used in human ways, whatever those may be. So Gould may be doing nothing more
in his essay than anyone does when confronted by words that get in the way of desired results:
Let the results define the words. This is not, then, “manipulation” as a pejorative; it is a wellrecognized form of normativity: The ends justify the (linguistic) means.
Two serious problems attend applying this approach to Gould’s essay. The first and most
obvious is that Gould himself certainly does not understand his argument about the concept of a
“strike” to be so crass. He clearly thinks his, and Babe Pinelli’s, use of the word is not merely
instrumental, it is fully legitimate. It is a use, in other words, that not only gleeful Yankee fans,
but also disappointed Dodger fans, should accept and honor. The values of both camps, he would
argue, are here vindicated, which should cause all of us to praise Pinelli’s call rather than
criticize it. This is an ambitious contention to which we will return in a moment.
The other difficulty with understanding language as infinitely flexible and simply selfserving is that language does not, and cannot, work that way. I have argued this point at length in
other legal contexts: 53 If words can be made to mean anything, then they will mean nothing. Of
all the information that is out there that people want to communicate, words, to be able to
accomplish the task of information transfer, must designate some identifiable piece of that vast
range, not any and all of it. “Baseball” cannot include the game of “football” (whether in its
American meaning or otherwise), nor can it include the noodles called “spaghetti” or the vehicle
called “airplane.” If it could, then I would have little idea what you might be talking about if our
conversation turned to “baseball.” Language can only be effective—be meaningful—if it
excludes as it includes.
A straightforward way to deal with these two linguistic challenges—claiming legitimacy
and avoiding non-arbitrariness—is to borrow from mathematics the simple notion of set theory.
Think of a word as denominating a set (which is usually depicted as a circle) of instances or
examples, each of which will be communicated when the word is used. The more general the
word (“dog”), the more instances follow (the bigger the circle becomes); the more specific
(“poodle”), the fewer. Scientists and similar professionals are of course constantly trying to make
their words as specific and narrow as possible to make their linguistic references as precise as
they can be. Lawyers and judges, on the other hand, are—ironically and, to many,
disconcertingly—engaged in a rather different analytical exercise.
As any competent lawyer can tell you, and as all law students learn very quickly, the law,
based as it is in language, is anything but precise, clear, and unwavering. It is instead slippery,
malleable, and uncertain. Lawyers would be among the first to embrace philosophy’s
postmodernism, with its rejection of objective truth or singular perspectives on meaning. Yet
lawyers, and certainly judges, do not then extend this thinking so far as to reject the idea of
meaning altogether. There is—there must be—some sense of truth, some reasonable accuracy,
out there toward which we are imperfectly striving: Without this assumption, the entire legal
52

A useful summary of the basic premises that characterize postmodernism can be found in Peter C. Schanck,
Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505,
2508-09 (1992).
53
Timothy P. Terrell, “Property,” “Due Process,” and the Distinction Between Definition and Theory in Legal
Analysis, 70 GEO. L.J. 861 (1982) [hereinafter Terrell, Property].
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enterprise is pointless, and worse, deceptive. Postmodernism is fine, in other words, up to a
point. How then to reconcile these twin urges to accept ambiguity while simultaneously acting as
if there is clarity? How, in the context of Gould’s essay, can a pitch be both a “strike” and “high
and outside”?
The trick to doing this with a straight face is to return to the concept of set theory and add
some additional steps. The key for present purposes is to recognize that language reflects a basic
philosophical divide between “is” and “ought”: 54 between the (relatively) objective “facts” that
are captured by the use of a word (labeled here “context”) and the quite subjective “values” that
are being furthered or vindicated by the use of the word (here, “hypertext”). The former is about
dictionaries—a chronicle of how a particular population most often “in fact” uses a given term.
The latter, however, is about agendas—how the word can be used to accomplish some “good” or
“end.” The former is descriptive and sociological; the latter is prescriptive and philosophical.
Only together—never alone—do these elements produce the full, practical “meaning” of a term.
B. On the “Meaning” of “Strike:” Teaching Law Students to Think Like Lawyers
Although the immediate topic of this segment of this Article is “text,” you will note how
quickly and inescapably we move into other dimensions in the earlier diagram, all of which will
be developed in more detail in subsequent sections. At this point, however, we need an example
that can bring this analytical interplay dramatically to the surface. That is precisely what Gould’s
article about Umpire Pinelli’s called strike provides.
I will ask my class 55 to define a strike 56 (in baseball, not labor law 57 ). They will
immediately refer to the physical space between armpits and knees and over the width of home
plate, as anyone familiar with the sport would know. I then ask how they know this to be an
accurate definition. They will make some vague reference to some baseball rulebook that must
be lying somewhere in the background, even though none of them has actually seen a copy. This,
they realize, is what Gould meant by the “technical definition” of the concept. But if we assume
that this rulebook is indeed “official,” and thus otherwise a legitimate and “authoritative” source
to be consulted, how can Larson’s pitch be labeled a strike, which the rulebook limits to certain
physical circumstances? Obviously, something other than the rulebook seems to matter in giving
54

See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
The class to which I refer was a first semester, first year course at one time (but no longer) offered at Emory Law
School (which a number of law schools have, under varying labels) called “Legal Methods.” It is intended to be an
extended and rigorous exploration of the “tools” of legal thinking and argumentation: precedent, statutes, and
administrative regulation. I treated the course as if its title were “Jurisprudence-Lite.” I have also occasionally used
Gould’s essay as introductory material in my course in Jurisprudence.
56
My Emory colleague Professor Robert Schapiro has noted to me that perhaps this entire analysis is incomplete
because Gould’s essay actually also depends on a theory of a “walk.” The problem, he argues, is that a walk is not at
the moral core of baseball, even though it is part of the duel between pitcher and batter. It is an exception to the
“excellence” of play we expect of competent players. “Real men,” he contends—as well as official scorers for the
sport—do not “count” walks. Hence, there is a kind of hollowness and defensiveness to the expression “a walk is as
good as a hit.” To the contrary, the biggest, most memorable games turn on hitting, not walking. Consequently, in
games like the World Series, perhaps a thumb is already on the scale in favor of strikes.
57
Although the same word can have different meanings in various contexts, often, as Ludwig Wittgenstein famously
noted, these uses can be related by “family relationships” that connect their independent uses to shared
characteristics across a range of uses in the language. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 241 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 2001) (1953). One example he used was the word “game” that had various
connotations, but nevertheless formed a “family” of applications. Id. at 27-28. I do not think the two uses of the term
“strike” noted in the text have any sort of connection like this at all. They are simply distinct uses of the same six
letters.
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the concept of a strike its full meaning. The questions now are several: How is the dictionary of
baseball incomplete? What is the extra-textual source for this proposition? And how does this
mysterious source claim competing—and indeed in this case, superseding—legitimacy and
authority? This is deep stuff, and we are only talking baseball.
The answer, of course, is that the meaning of a term, just as Gould asserted, also depends
on context, but not just the factual circumstances in which the term is being used. This
substantive sense of context is the set of circumstances relevant to the use of the term, the facts
that somehow matter. These are identified only by reference to the values that lie behind the use
of the term. I make this point to the students by asking them for the “justification” for the word
“strike.” I ask them for its “theory.” They look at me quizzically. So I ask them why the word
“strike” matters to anyone—why it is being used here. They will usually respond that it matters
simply to know whether a batter is “out” or not, or something of that sort. But the next question
is obvious: So what? Why does knowing “out” matter? Ah, but that is important to the game,
they respond, satisfied that the line of questions has come to its natural and necessary end. But, I
ask, what is the “game” to which they refer? Is it baseball? Or is it a critical game in the World
Series? The latter is Gould’s context. Perhaps, then, we must always connect the fact of the
rulebook definition to the values at stake at the moment the term is invoked to know what a
strike “truly” is in that context. If so, Gould is right again: “Truth is a circumstance, not a spot.”
What is happening, of course, is that text (language), context (the game and its
surrounding circumstances), and hypertext (the normative values within baseball) are not just
colliding here, but fusing. And for the novice legal reasoner, who is hoping to memorize some
rule that will resolve things easily, this can be both confusing and upsetting.
Now the fight in class truly starts. Some students are quite critical of the idea that the
meaning of “strike” can float from game to game, context to context. For them, it is ordinarily a
matter of notice: How would you know, as a player, that the rules are shifting? How would you
know whether the umpire had the same perspective on the game that you did? How can the game
be played, reasonably and fairly, in such circumstances? At this point I simply play back for
them their own words, and note that instead of challenging the idea that values matter in the use
of a word, they have endorsed it: They have simply invoked the competing values associated
with “fairness” and fair play. The trick in this exercise, then, is not to reject the analytic move
that Gould makes in appealing to the ethereal values of the World Series, but to beat him at his
own game, appealing to different—and, you hope, somehow “better”—values. It is your sense of
context that should really matter, not his.
Note, for example, how Gould does not refer to “fairness” to justify his praise of Pinelli,
but to “justice.” Is there anything important in that choice of term? Or, as students ordinarily
assume, are the two words basically synonymous, communicating the same fundamental notion
of “good” or “being correct”?
But we are (again) getting ahead of ourselves. For now, we should just focus on what is
turning out to be an “inadequate” text—a rulebook definition of a vital concept that seems to
leave important questions unanswered. To simply say that now the argument shifts to “my values
are better than your values” leaves students deeply dissatisfied. How, they ask, can we arbitrate
between these competing claims? Gould has his values, I have mine; we are at stalemate. How
can we decide whether to praise or condemn Pinelli for his call? Indeed, how could anyone ever
argue with an umpire if the response we get is that the “values” of the game justify the call that
was made? Suddenly a group of students in the room realize that they are “strict constructionists”
and never knew it. They don’t like the idea of the umpire altering the nature of the game on the
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basis of some set of values that might be quite personal to that official, and the surest way of
being able to reign in this decision maker is to return to a value-circumscribed, “technical”
approach to the concept of a “strike.” The rulebook rules, they say, and properly so, if only to
avoid intractable debates about “bad” calls.
So, they conclude, Pinelli was wrong, and so is Gould. No wonder the umpire cried: He
knew he blew it, and in a big game with everyone watching. But, I ask them, is that the way the
game is in fact played? Is their approach consistent with the traditions of the sport and the
expectations of the players? That doesn’t matter, they say: It is the way the game should be
played. “Should?” I ask. Where did that come from in this argument ostensibly focused on the
“technical,” objective, rule-based definition of a strike? They look at me with consternation. The
rule is the thing that matters here—otherwise we would have chaos: The game itself would begin
to unravel. So, I observe, values are relevant here, after all, but they are now just the values
intrinsic to baseball itself, and its continuation. That’s correct, they concede, grudgingly. But do
these baseball values exist independent of the participants in this sport, and the history of the
playing of this game? Do the players and umpires and perhaps the spectators—their actions,
reactions, and varying circumstances and expectations—not matter at all to the values, and hence
to the rules, of their game? Does the fact, for example, that this was a World Series game not
matter at all? Feeling boxed in, the students’ response is emphatic: No. The “values” of baseball,
to the extent they exist at all, are reflected and captured in the technical rules of the game, in any
and all circumstances. That’s what rules are for: to prevent dumb arguments like the one they
have just endured.
With any luck, at this point, some brave and unintimidated soul speaks up—quite often
someone who has some personal experience with the game—and objects to this line of
reasoning. That is not the way the game is played, this student insists. The “rules” hardly capture
the way the game actually unfolds and is enjoyed. Does a shortstop actually have to touch second
base, while holding the ball, in the midst of turning a fast and furious double play, particularly in
the context of professional games where the players are so fast? Does the “infield fly” rule
actually have to be written down to be a part of the game? Do we actually have to articulate the
obvious point that the special circumstances of the World Series, and indeed a perfect game,
mold or shape the nature of the rules, or at least their application? If we replaced the umpire with
a computer that is programmed with only the “technical rules” of the game, would we still be
playing baseball? 58
I applaud the student’s resolve and passion, but then ask whether they have just made an
“is” or an “ought” argument: Is their opposition to the other student’s analysis based on
observations about the way the game is in fact played, or is it based on an implicit claim that the
way the players actually play and understand the game is also the right way to play and
understand the game? It seems to be both, but this is troubling, for you are not supposed to be
able to derive an “ought” directly and simply from an “is”: The actual way the players play could
perhaps be labeled as wrong from some different, perhaps deeper, perspective. Could that
perspective be, for example, “fairness”? Doesn’t this batter “deserve,” in some way, the
application to him of consistent expectations concerning his performance? Yes, the student will
concede, but other values might be relevant here as well—values like the “good” of the game as
a whole, or the recognition of the special demands of a World Series game, or of a perfect game,
or some other consideration that puts this particular batter in his appropriate “place” in this
analysis: The world—and particularly the World Series—does not revolve around him.
58
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But why not? Why isn’t this player entitled to the same consideration regardless of
circumstance? Why do his “rights” change just because the stakes have gone up? Shouldn’t we
be even more diligent to protect him from arbitrariness when “larger” forces are said to be at
work? 59
The discussion now usually descends into chaos, if anyone is willing to talk at all. The
“strict constructionists” seem more adamant than ever to focus on the rule, and its sanctity, but
for different reasons: Some emphasize the importance of the individual batter, and are concerned
with his potential victimization. Some emphasize the pitcher, and argue that he should be
honored with the mantle of “perfect game” only in the narrowest of circumstances. Some don’t
worry about the players so much as the game and its rules—these players are but momentary
occupants of this space called baseball, and the forces that preceded them and will sustain the
activity into the future should be the focus here, meaning that the “technical” rules that have both
history and the dependence of the future behind them should control.
The other camp is just as adamant, and as diverse. Some see the situation quite broadly—
the game and its heritage and its viability are indeed the key—but that doesn’t mean that the
technical rules are paramount. Quite the contrary, the larger values reflected in the game must be
honored, and that means seeing a “strike” for what it “truly” is: merely one step in a more
complex dance that has an elegance that must be recognized above all else. Others, however, are
a bit leery of turning the analysis over to an abstract appreciation of some “dance,” where a range
of unanchored images might compete and clash. They want the “steps” (the rules) to be given
more respect, but not to be viewed in isolation. The rules exist for reasons intrinsic to the game
itself, and it is that set of more limited values that must be given emphasis. But values of some
sort are nevertheless primary in the analysis, rather than secondary, and the umpire’s job is
ultimately, then, to be sensitive to those normative concerns.
Now everyone is dissatisfied, except me. I hope the class has at least recognized that the
differences of opinion they have developed are all based initially in the rather simple observation
that the “meaning” of a “strike” has varied initially on the basis of the separation of “is” from
“ought” (in the terminology here, from context to hypertext)—the difference between describing
the facts of the situation and justifying the values implicated by the situation. But the
disagreement goes much deeper, for the facts seem to be understood quite differently by different
students: Is the key circumstance the dual between pitcher and batter, or more generally the game
of baseball? Or is it the World Series baseball game, or the perfect World Series baseball game?
And which values ought to matter here? Fairness? Or Gould’s seemingly larger sense of
“justice”? And how do we go about picking the values that will be infused into the analysis? In
the final analysis, aren’t the facts a function of the values we espouse, and the values we espouse
a function of the facts upon which we focus?
On the basis of what has been said so far, there seems to be no way to assess the call
made by Umpire Pinelli. Some think it is correct, others that it is incorrect, and the “insight” of
the distinction between “is” and “ought” doesn’t help to resolve that impasse. Instead,
differences between description and justification seem equally illusive, if not simply perverse.
We’re back to “I’m OK, you’re OK.” We have gone round and round, and ended up nowhere.
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This is Ronald Dworkin’s basic conception of “rights”: You have a “right” when you are permitted to do
something even though, all things considered, the community would be better off if you didn’t act. This is based on
his distinction between “principles,” which establish individual rights, and “policies,” which establish collective
goals. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 20, at 90-94.
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Not so, I reassure the class: They are simply becoming lawyers. They are beginning to
appreciate the characteristics of annoying, but quite practical, argument. “Practical?” they
almost want to howl. “Okay, then, which is it?” they ask me in great frustration. Was Pinelli
correct or incorrect?
I can’t answer that question, I tell them, until they answer another: Who is paying me?
Lights go off, and the theology majors groan. The worst fears of many in the class are now
realized, as the crass cynicism and instrumentalism at the heart of law practice—the “true”
meaning and point of multi-dimensional legal reasoning—is revealed. All that counts is money.
Postmodernism wins after all.
Not so fast, I suggest. Developing an argument that will protect a client’s interests is not
necessarily evil or arbitrary: Would it make any difference to you if Don Larson or Dale Mitchell
were your brother? Disagreeing with someone who is arguing for the wrong result isn’t a bad
thing at all. So, rather than assuming that the entire mental exercise is capricious, perhaps a
better way out of this soup is to go in deeper. What might be useful would be a more
sophisticated understanding of these two basic camps of “is” and “ought,” which might reveal
that they have form and symmetry as well.
That is the task of the next two sections.
IV. THE CHALLENGE OF “IS”: “CONTEXT” AS DETERMINING THE “SCALE” OF THE ANALYSIS
At the heart of Gould’s defense of Umpire Pinelli is his assertion that “Context matters.
Truth is a circumstance, not a spot.” Truth is not a single house; it is an entire neighborhood. The
pitch was a strike because it found itself in this magical circumstantial “vicinity” of a strike. 60
How did it get there? And what is this “there”?
The relevance of context to an argument about social guidance—whether baseball rules or
legal rules—is an application and expansion of the basic “is/ought” distinction lying in the
linguistic background: Do the facts actually matter to this analysis, or is everything controlled
simply by normative values?
The actual circumstances that bring a situation to the attention of decision makers can
indeed matter—can make the situation distinctive—in some readily identifiable ways. One,
involving the typical patterns or themes into which facts can be divided, is a rather obvious point
relating to the nature of stories or narratives as a general proposition. It is developed briefly in
the first subsection below. Other methods by which facts can take on independent significance in
the analysis of a matter are, however, rather subtle, as they begin to connect various factual
patterns to themes of “guidance” and “assessment,” and hence “governance,” and therefore form
the foundation for “legal stories” more particularly. These will be developed at greater length in
the subsequent three subsections. They deserve this extra attention because they will present the
clearer, more direct link of this section’s contextual “is” to the analytic “ought” of hypertext in
Part V.
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The idea of “vicinity” is directly related to the “set theory” on which the approach to linguistics in this article is
based. See Terrell, Property, supra note 53. Another version of this idea was once related to me by a judge who
commented that his father, a veteran of World War II, told him that ordinarily you don’t have to be perfect, you just
need to be “grenade close.”
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First, foundational to describing situations—or telling stories generally—is simply the
implicit understanding, as journalists are trained, that a “complete” story will include reference
to the basic patterns or divisions into which facts most naturally fall: the who, what, when,
where, and why/how sets of informational detail that comprise the situation. 61 In other words, the
circumstances that may relate or distinguish two cases could be a focus on or an emphasis of any
one or more of the following: Who, the key individuals in the situation—for example, the
identity of the parties, or of important participants, or of witnesses; What, the materials,
documents, things, or issues that are of particular interest; When, the sequence of events that
produced the situation; Where, the location or other geographical context in which an incident
should be placed; and Why/how, the explanation or motive for events.
This is, of course, the stuff of the first week of law school: Mr. Brown and Ms. Green can
be factually compared in any number of ways: They might both be employed as teachers, or be
brother and sister; they might both be the owners of a particular kind of automobile; they might
both have been born on the same day; they might both be residents of a particular city; they
might both be the victims of identity theft.
Which of these factual or circumstantial themes really matters here is a function of the
deeper inquiry into the values of hypertext, which we have yet to bring into the analysis fully and
directly. Nevertheless, this attention to factual context allows us to sense that an assessment of
the situation may have normative subdivisions within it driven or anchored by contextual details.
Gould’s essay blends these factors into a seamless story of singular significance: We have
the “what” of not just a baseball game, but a World Series game, and the subtle “when” of being
at the very end of that game. The “who” is not just a bunch of players and spectators, but
individuals with names: the key professionals, including Pinelli and Larson and so on, and the
key observers, including Gould himself, his classmate, and their teacher. It is not just a story, but
a dramatic one. Most dramatically, these elements then ineluctably combine to support the
reasonable conclusion that the pitch was a strike, not because of bias or cheating or other
inappropriate attitude, but because the circumstances somehow dictated that it had to be.
But how does Gould achieve this? The essay contained no explicit appeal to particular
values, and yet Gould has somehow managed to make the values that will be applied look
obvious and inevitable rather than controversial. Somehow we just know how this particular
story will, and must, come out. Apparently, for this seemingly innocuous, innocent analysis to
have such influence, more must be going on in this circumstantial “is” realm than mere
traditional fact categories.
B. Context as Legal Categories
For any lawyer, another form of categorization also seems immediately relevant: the
traditional divisions of the law itself. Most of the time, this is not a complicated point: The case
involves two parties trying to reach an agreement about something, so the legal context is
therefore contract law; or they have been involved in an automobile crash, so the context is torts;
or they are trying to buy and sell a patent, so a combination of contract and property law will be
relevant. This rather rudimentary observation is important, however, because much baggage
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This quick summary is developed further, with examples, in STEPHEN V. ARMSTRONG & TIMOTHY P. TERRELL,
THINKING LIKE A WRITER: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE WRITING AND EDITING 111-120 (3d ed. 2008).
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follows from these characterizations. 62 The traditions and expectations that are typical of these
areas will color and sometimes dictate the way the matter will be handled. Thus, as an aspect of
legal reasoning, any lawyer would pay attention to this particular form of context as well.
Gould’s essay is once again a useful non-legal introduction to this point. The “legal”
context of the Pinelli call is implicit, but no less emphatic: We are not to apply the rule-set of
ordinary baseball to this pitch, but the separate and special set of extraordinary baseball rules. A
strike may be one thing in the former, but it becomes a different thing in the latter. Although the
physical facts have not changed—Gould readily concedes that the pitch was indeed “high and
outside”—our understanding or appreciation of that physical fact certainly has. The key point is
this: While the call may seem inconsistent with the ordinary rules, it is quite consistent with the
extraordinary rules. By switching the “legal” circumstances simultaneously with his emphasis of
certain factual circumstances, Gould’s argument seems all the more reasonable and compelling.
The intriguing observation about the connection between facts and law is not, then, simply
that the choice of facts can influence or determine the legal category that will be considered
relevant—as noted earlier, that an accident puts us within tort law, and so on—but that the
opposite may be at work: Because we want a particular legal category to be the focus, that then
tells us which facts we should emphasize. For example, in Gould’s essay, which do you think
came first—his “who” and “what” facts, or the special “legal” realm of extraordinary baseball
rules? They seem to act inextricably together to compel us toward the conclusion he wants us to
reach: It is because this alternative universe of pseudo-strikes exists (at least for Gould) that he
can select the facts that will get us there.
But where did this alternative “legal” realm come from? Nothing in Gould’s facts dictates
that this separate context must exist. It is evident, then, that something more than the simple “is”
of both factual and legal categories, in and of themselves, is at work. And just as evidently, that
factor is the influence of hypertextual values, the element of legal reasoning we have yet to
develop. But it would be premature to jump to that new topic immediately, for Gould’s essay is
only an analogy for, or approximation of, the professional sense of legal reasoning that is the
actual subject of this Article. Thus, we need a more traditionally legal example of this
phenomenon of the outcome of a case being influenced—perhaps even determined—by the
availability of alternative legal, rather than factual, contexts.
Fortunately, we have not only a fine example, but the perspective of a legal philosopher as
well that will better enable us to appreciate it.
The example is the remarkable decision by Judge J. Skelly Wright of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 63 which was the first
case in the country to recognize the new legal doctrine in landlord-tenant law of a “warranty of
habitability” 64 —the right of tenants to withhold rent payments when the premises they have
leased become “uninhabitable.” Prior to this decision, the tradition in this area of law—
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Although there are countless examples of this proposition, one of the most entertaining is the development of the
“right of publicity,” which began life as an adjunct to the “right of privacy.” The question that arose was whether
this publicity right was inheritable by a famous person’s heirs. One conceptual problem was that if the publicity
right retained its privacy roots, privacy was understood to be a “liberty” interest, and such interests are extinguished
with the person’s death. But if publicity could be reimagined as a “property” interest, the analysis would change
simply because one of the well-known attributes of property is that it is inheritable. And that, basically, is the way
the issue was resolved. See Timothy P. Terrell & Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A
Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1 (1985).
63
428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
64
Id. at 1072-73.

60

Vol. 8:1]

Timothy P. Terrell

specifically, this area of property law—had always been, quite simply, that the responsibility to
pay rent was independent of the condition of the premises. 65 In effect, tenants were imagined to
be like their agrarian forebears who were, by necessity, jacks-of-all-trades, able to make repairs
themselves. Rent simply represented the grant of permission by the landlord for the tenant to be
on the premises; what those premises were like and what the tenant did there were largely up to
the tenant.
Judge Wright’s opinion is famous, in part, for its fundamental rethinking of this entire
legal context. Rather than accept and apply the traditional property doctrine of landlord-tenant
law, he reexamined it critically, concluding that its foundational assumptions were inaccurate
and antiquated. Tenants today, he concluded, desire—and indeed expect—much more than just
access to particular premises. 66 They are not farmers anymore, but—particularly in Judge
Wright’s context of Washington, D.C.—city dwellers, many of whom would be, like Ms. Javins,
of very modest financial means. Such persons pay rent, he found, to obtain “shelter” for
themselves and their families adequate to maintain some modicum of health and happiness. 67
Tenants assume, Judge Wright decided, that they will receive in exchange for their rent payments
premises that are at least “habitable.” 68 He therefore held that all residential leases within his
jurisdiction would have implied into them a new clause—a “warranty of habitability”—that
embodied and vindicated the tenant’s expectations. 69
But, reasonable as the outcome of this case appears to be to modern eyes, it was quite a
legal stretch at the time. Judge Wright’s problem was that he had no (or very little and
distinguishable) precedent in the area of landlord-tenant law on which to base his conclusion. 70
So he didn’t try to do so. Instead, he reached out to another area of law to find support: contract
law, and its rapidly developing, and widely accepted, concept of “warranties of fitness.” Within
that setting, he noted, were plenty of judicial decisions imposing on sellers of goods the
requirement—even if not explicitly stated in the sale contract—that the item exchanged would be
fit or appropriate for the purpose for which it was purchased. 71 Rental premises, he reasoned,
were just “like” this: They were a kind of commodity—more accurately, a bundle of services that
Judge Wright labeled “shelter” 72 —that had been purchased by the tenant with a rather clear
purpose in mind: to obtain a place where one could “live,” in a larger sense than merely “exist.”
Armed with this extra weapon of precedent, Judge Wright had no difficulty in
concluding—now from the safety of existing legal support—that every residential lease in the
District of Columbia had within it a “warranty of habitability,” even though no lease document
itself actually contained any such provision. It was a clause that Ms. Javins was “legitimately” 73
entitled to expect, even though she had almost certainly never actually thought about it.
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See id. at 1074 (noting that “in traditional analysis, a lease was the conveyance of an interest in land, [and so]
courts have usually utilized the special rules governing real property transactions to resolve controversies involving
leases”).
66
Id. at 1074.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1072-73.
70
See id. at 1074-75.
71
Id. at 1075.
72
Id. at 1074.
73
Id. at 1075 (“In order to reach results more in accord with the legitimate expectations of the parties . . . courts have
been gradually introducing more modern precepts of contract law in interpreting leases.”).
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The key here, then, is this: Legal legitimacy for Wright’s conclusion came not from the
area of law traditionally applied in this landlord-tenant context—property law, with its focus on
the “things” being traded in a market. While this would certainly have been the expectation of
Ms. Javins’ landlord, that did not matter to this court. Instead, Judge Wright was focused on
“relationships”—the human connection between Ms. Javins and her landlord, the reasons that
brought them together to create this lease. That perspective allowed him to tap the resources of a
parallel doctrinal universe, contract and sales law, with its emphasis on “meetings of minds” and
“expectations.” The judicial result of an implied warranty—indeed, a nonnegotiable
warranty 74—thus seemed quite reasonable and unsurprising, rather than remarkably creative.
This masterful bit of legal reasoning also enjoys powerful scholarly support as well,
although it was developed many years later and without attention to this particular case or area of
law. In his book Law’s Empire, 75 Professor Ronald Dworkin reconsiders 76 his previous efforts to
develop a comprehensive theory of adjudication, and produces an elegant and impressive new
vision he labels “law as integrity” 77—a descriptive and normative theory of the method by which
he believes judges should analyze challenging cases so as to reach decisions with intellectual and
moral “integrity.” It is a complex picture—and one quite consistent with the framework
suggested by Professor Schauer—but it can be reduced to two basic elements, one of which is
relevant here, the other to be discussed further in the next section. To reason with “integrity,” a
judge must combine a careful analysis of “fit” 78—the way the current decision integrates into the
existing legal material it must now join (which I have here called legal context)—with an
appreciation of the responsibility to put the law into its “best light” 79 —the more general
normative implications the opinion will have in making the law and the legal system look “good”
or “bad” (which is the hypertext of the next section). In other words, judges must honor both, on
the one hand, a sense of consistency and connectedness with the past and, on the other, a
substantive concern with “justice” and “fairness.” 80
At this level of abstraction, none of this analysis is particularly surprising, but it does
suggest something quite important to the approach to legal reasoning being argued in this article:
If Professor Dworkin is serious about these two large analytic categories, then it would seem to
follow inevitably that neither fit nor best light is a single, uncontroversial “thing” or instance or
entity, but instead more akin to a variable, like in algebra. Appropriate “fit” might be achieved, a
judge could believe, by lumping eight out of ten cases together, with the remaining two being
considered “mistakes,” 81 or it might be seven out of the ten. Similarly, “best light” could be
viewed within some range of philosophically justified results—that is, some results are
particularly “good,” others only modestly so. If so, then both these two categories of reasoning
74

Id. at 1081-82 (“The duties imposed by the Housing Regulations [which now include the warranty of habitability
which they help create] may not be waived or shifted by agreement if the Regulations specifically place the duty
upon the lessor.”); id. at 1082 n.58 (“Any private agreement to shift the duties would be illegal and unenforceable.”).
75
See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 35.
76
This is my characterization of Professor Dworkin’s effort, not his. Professor Dworkin has never acknowledged, as
far as I know, that he has ever changed his mind on any aspect of his legal theory; he has simply refined and
expanded initially correct ideas.
77
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 35 at 225-275.
78
Id. at 230.
79
Id. at 231.
80
Id. at 249.
81
Professor Dworkin discusses in Taking Rights Seriously the inevitability of having to recognize some prior
judicial decisions as “mistakes” if the principles on which the legal system is based are to be properly implemented.
See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 20, at 118-123.
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have ranges of different degrees or amounts that can be attributed to them, with those degrees in
turn ranging from some sort of “low” to “high.” Thus, one convenient way to imagine the
interaction between consistency and normativity is the following graphic representation: 82
Figure 1

The area labeled “integrity” in the graph is therefore the range of possible decisions that a court
could reach in a particular case that would at least have been arrived at through a legitimate
reasoning process, as far as Professor Dworkin is concerned. A case does not, therefore, have
one unique appropriate outcome (it could have several), but it does have one unique route by
which an appropriate result can be reached, and an identifiable “area” of appropriate results. 83
82

This graph is my invention, and should not be attributed to Professor Dworkin. I think it is an accurate depiction
of his analysis, but he did not put it in this form. And in this form, it is too simple to capture the further complexity
that Professor Dworkin adds: “Fit” is itself a function of multiple dimensions, as discussed in the text above, see
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 35, at 230, and the notion of making the law the “best” it can be is similarly a
function of at least two, and perhaps three, additional factors (the “justice” and “fairness” noted in the text, along
with “procedural due process,” see id. at 243).
83
I hasten to note, however, that this idea of an “area” of appropriate decisions is not necessarily consistent with
Professor Dworkin’s own understanding of his analysis, but the text of this article is not the place to resolve that
difficulty. Nor will it be resolved in this footnote either—just developed a bit further.
The issue here is Professor Dworkin’s famous claim that a judge who employs an appropriately rich
analytic technique to decide a case (meaning, of course, Professor Dworkin’s technique) will be able to produce a
“right answer” in every case—an answer somehow uniquely dictated by determining the correct amount of
consistency with prior decisions, the correct identification of the normative principles that animate the legal system
as a whole, and the correct mix of these two elements. The image would be that the axes above would have a single
spot on each of them where the “correct” degree of that element exists, and the interaction of the two of them would
produce a singular “spot” or point within the graph, rather than an “area” of multiple results. This proposition has
been developed by Professor Dworkin in different places in his work, see, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?,
in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 58 (P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz eds., 1977),
but the most elaborate defense of it may be the portions of Law’s Empire that precede his elaboration of the “law
and integrity” technique in the chapter that bears that title, as well as in that chapter itself. See DWORKIN, LAW’S
EMPIRE, supra note 35, at 45-86, 260-63. But having examined these discussions carefully, I am convinced that
Professor Dworkin is not defending (nor need he defend) the rather strange proposition that each difficult case has,
lurking beneath its complexity, a singular, correct answer with which no reasonable judge (or other person more
generally, for that matter) could disagree. Instead, Professor Dworkin’s claim is that in reaching a decision “with
integrity,” a judge is at least announcing that this result is the unique, and uniquely appropriate, decision for this
judge. In other words, the decision and the process by which it was reached are both taken by this judge very
seriously, such that the judge can claim that the decision is the very best that he or she can produce. The judge is
satisfied, in other words, that he or she has, in Dworkin’s terms, “impose[d] order over doctrine.” Id. at 273.
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The relevance of Professor Dworkin’s analysis to this article’s thesis is therefore rather
obviously that fit corresponds to the current topic of context (both factual and legal), while best
light corresponds to the topic in the next section of hypertext. And certainly his approach
illustrates quite well the same analytic point being made here that these two dimensions are
indivisibly interconnected—you cannot adequately assess one without reference to the other. But
more specifically concerning our present focus on context and its artful manipulation in Javins,
Professor Dworkin’s analysis is particularly interesting because he defines the concept of fit
quite creatively, and in just the way Judge Wright seems to understand it as well. Rather than
simply “counting up” cases that are directly “on point,” Dworkin argues that the relationships
within the supporting data should be seen in a series of “concentric circles,” 84 with the most
similar precedents being given extra weight through a sense of “local priority” 85 —weight,
however, that can nevertheless be overcome by stronger principles emanating from other areas of
the law. Using the example of a tort case involving emotional injury, he argues that the good
judge (whom he calls Hercules 86) would proceed in a series of analytic steps:
He asks which interpretations [of prior law] on his initial list fit past emotional
injury cases, then which ones fit cases of accidental damage to the person more
generally, then which fit damage to economic interests, and so on into areas each
further and further from the original . . . issue. This procedure gives a kind of
local priority to what we might call “departments” of law. 87
Thus, if there aren’t enough tort cases available to meet the dimension of fit adequately, the
judge can reach out to contract cases to examine their relevant principles, and perhaps to

Consequently, for any particular judge, the graph above would indeed have a single spot on each axis
where the judge fixes the “amount” of each variable, and their intersection will in turn identify a single spot within
the graph where the “right answer” in the case resides. But different judges, as reasonable people, could fix the
amount of the two variables differently, and thus if we were to plot all these possible results, we would end up with
the “area” depicted in the text. All of these decisions would be able to claim legitimacy through Professor Dworkin’s
process of “integrity.”
Even though this elaboration of Professor Dworkin’s thesis is necessarily a limited one, two additional
points must nevertheless be made about it that are directly related to the themes of this Article. First, note that the
difference between the “right answer” understood from the perspective of a particular judge (the “spot”) and the
“right answer” from the perspective of the judiciary as a whole (the “area”) is a straightforward application of the
“micro/macro” element within legal reasoning generally that is the focus of this section of the Article. Thus, the
confusion on this point concerning Professor Dworkin’s message should not be all that surprising.
But second, and more importantly, the difference between the “spot” and the “area” within the graph is
critical to appreciating the distinction between a theory of “law” and a theory of “lawyering.” This article is about
the latter, and by extension about the former. The key observation here is this: If the result of Professor Dworkin’s
integrity thesis is the “spot” of a singular, uniquely legitimate result in every case, then every lawyer (or dissenting
judge) who has argued in favor of a different position or result—using Professor Dworkin’s own analytic
technique—is either a liar or a fool. The “right answer” takes on a mystical and mythical characteristic of
ontological perfection that is both, as noted above, counterintuitive and unnecessary. Lawyers (and judges) who
argue a losing cause do not lack “integrity,” under any reasonable definition of that concept. They have instead
simply identified a different “spot” within the area of “integrity” that is the “right answer” for them.
84
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 35, at 250.
85
Id.
86
See supra note 20.
87
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 35, at 250.
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property cases, and so on, to build support within existing authoritative sources. In the context of
Javins, the circles of authority might look like this:
Figure 2

Quite evidently, the dimensions of fit and making the law look its best are not at all starkly
separate from each other as the graph above suggests.
One way to imagine this exercise is to view fit as having two dimensions of its own, what
we could call “vertical” and “horizontal” consistency. The former is the more traditional search
by a court (or lawyers more generally) for support for a decision by reviewing the existing legal
material (prior opinions, say) in a given area of the law, and doing so chronologically—and
hence “vertically”—over the many years that preceded the present case. For example, in the
Javins opinion, this would be Judge Wright’s search through the doctrinal context of property
law for landlord-tenant cases supporting some kind of implied warranty of fitness. On the basis
of that effort alone, Judge Wright’s intended conclusion—that such a warranty exists within
current law—would look very shaky indeed, for very little support for that proposition could be
identified. 88 Thus, on the basis of the element of fit—the vertical axis in the “integrity” graph
above—he would find himself toward the bottom. This would mean, in turn, that to hold that a
warranty of habitability actually exists within the law, and to reach that decision with
“integrity,” he will have to work extraordinarily hard on the dimension of best light to push the
normative force behind his decision as far to the right in the graph as possible—that is, to
88

The analysis would involve something like the following, although all the numbers in this chart are purely
imaginary:

This data, if it were real, would indicate that the case law support for a warranty of quality within the realm of
property law alone over time—a “vertical” analysis alone—would be quite low, and that the variable of “fit” in the
integrity diagram would be correspondingly low. If, however, the search for case law support were extended across
the range of doctrinal areas, support would increase substantially, and the “fit” amount would correspondingly go
up.
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maximize that variable—to allow the minimal fit to be overcome, and the decision thus to appear
to be within the “integrity area” of the graph. 89
The brilliance of Judge Wright’s decision, however, is his skillful avoidance of that
pressure by making an analytic move Professor Dworkin would heartily endorse: rethinking the
dimension of fit by extending his search for support “horizontally” beyond the area of property
law to include other (parallel, in a way) doctrinal legal areas like contract and tort law, where the
critical underlying feature of relationships is more important, more evident, and more developed.
Thus, by searching “across” the law, and counting the numerous decisions that appear in other
“lines” (vertically) of cases that have imposed on sellers of goods implied warranties of fitness,
Judge Wright found the fit—the preexisting legal support—he needed to make his decision
concerning landlords all the more obvious and acceptable. In effect, he could move up the fit
axis of the graph, and correspondingly make his decision seem all that much more obviously to
fall well within the realm of integrity, and hence legal acceptability. His opinion, then, despite its
evident boldness and creativity, and especially its controversial emphasis on the normative
importance of protecting low-income tenants, could nevertheless look traditionally grounded and
reasonable.
And so it is for Umpire Pinelli as well. Professor Gould does not want to be confined to
arguing solely (and defensively) that the called strike was correct because the values of
baseball—putting the sport in its best light—somehow alone demand that result. Although he
will certainly so contend, he also wants to give the call additional support by placing it within the
correct “legal” context as well, where “baseball precedent” will make it look reasonable. He
wants the call to fit, in other words, within the history and traditions of baseball in a more
descriptive, factual sense. He accomplishes this only by assertion, however, rather than citing
particular authority: He contends that ample precedent exists for the proposition that in the
circumstances of the “big game” a batter must “swing at anything close.” But we can certainly
see better now why he seems compelled to make that argument: Putting baseball in its best light
requires a more creative assessment of baseball precedent, and in turn, understanding that
precedent in a broader form reveals the underlying values of the sport. Voila: Impressive
decisional integrity generated through both variables.
C. The Combined Contexts of “Scale”: Of Macro and Micro, and Justice and Fairness
Lying beneath the attention to, and manipulation of, context in each of our examples—the
Javins decision, Professor Dworkin’s concept of fit, and Professor Gould’s assertions of
historical foundation—and the way each switches between factual and legal distinctions, is an
analytic perspective particularly fundamental to legal reasoning: the role played by the scale at
which the context will be considered or defined. This step in fact establishes a critical link to the

89
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next, and perhaps most controversial, element of legal reasoning, which will be examined in
detail in Part V, infra: how these circumstances will be normatively assessed. But this transition
between, on the one hand, what a legal arguer would like the audience to believe is a relatively
objective establishment of context, and what the arguer must concede is the subjective, messier
world of values, is sufficiently pivotal to the reasoning process that it needs more attention. The
analytic dichotomy in this realm is not simply the difference between facts and law, or among
various factual and legal categories, but a subtler factor. What connects the facts and law, and
produces the true “legal story” before us for consideration, is the potential breadth of the
implications of the story.
Quite simply, “scale,” or breadth, means levels of generality or specificity. 90 One way to
organize this for law students is to suggest a rather familiar “fact pyramid,” where the base is the
most general view of a situation and the top is its narrowest:
Figure 3

For example, the factual context of a case could be, at the top of the pyramid, that it involves
specifically the ignition system of a Ford Taurus automobile, or, one step down, the electronics
system in that automobile, or, more generally, an automobile of any sort, or machinery, or
perhaps at its most general, things that are man-made, as opposed to naturally occurring. How
should a court determine the precedential “relevance” or “meaning” of its opinion? To what
kinds of cases will it be relevant in the future?
Gould’s essay is once again a terrific example of careful attention to this analytic detail. On
this point of breadth, Gould is quite consistent, and emphatic: he is relentlessly “micro.” The
Pinelli call did not involve merely any baseball game, like some generic and ordinary fish
plucked from the ocean. No, this involved a big fish, perilously caught: Much more specifically
and specially, this call occurred in an enormously significant World Series game.
Correspondingly, this special game context means that, for Gould, the human context is just as
narrow and specific: The participants here are not just a pitcher and a batter, but much more

90

See Terrell, Epistemology, supra note 41, at 536.
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personally, Don Larson—by name—the “competent, but otherwise undistinguished Yankee
pitcher,” and Dale Mitchell—again, by name—a mere pinch hitter.
This very focused attention is not an accident, nor is it merely an effort to give his
argument a “homey” or human touch. It is a deliberate effort on Gould’s part to push our
consideration of appropriate values in the right direction. Since this is a particularly important
point, allow me to rephrase it: If we are concerned simply about the care and feeding of baseball
players generally, we may fret about Pinelli’s call a little bit as it might be imposed on this
generic group; but if we see the situation personally (as Gould wants us to) as involving Larson
and Mitchell individually in a magical, unique moment, we may connect more directly, and
hence sympathize more readily, with values that legitimize Pinelli’s call, and worry less about its
technical inaccuracy.
The critical point here is that we do not simply apply values to a situation—we worry quite
explicitly about the scale, or level of generality, at which those values are going to be applied.
Indeed, as Gould well illustrates, the decision about scale can be part and parcel of the normative
inquiry—we find particular values to be critical because of the scale at which we choose to view
the situation. If this is so, it becomes difficult to determine which—normative values (hypertext)
or descriptive scale (context)—is truly dominant in the analysis.
To tie this discussion of scale back to the topic of language, with which we began, it is
interesting to note that we have two different words that summarize our normative assessment of
events that occur within the two different contextual views of the game. 91 If our perspective is
“macro”—being concerned with the overall circumstance of the game of baseball in our society,
and just as generally the thousands of people who play the game at any given time—then we
ordinarily say that “justice” or “injustice” has occurred. If, on the other hand, our view is
“micro”—as we focus on particularized events and people—then we characterize an event as
“fair” or “unfair.” For example, children, who by definition see the world around them as
focused on them quite specially, will label a disappointment in their expectations as “unfair,” not
“unjust.” Justice, then, is about society, while fairness is about you and me. 92
Interestingly, even though Gould establishes a relentless micro focus in his essay, he
nevertheless refers only to justice rather than fairness. This is not altogether surprising, since, as I
noted earlier, few people actually perceive a difference between the two terms. I would put
Gould in this camp. This is not, however, necessarily an analytic defect. By conflating justice
and fairness, he is inadvertently connecting himself to a recognized and respected philosophical
tradition. John Rawls, in his much-admired work, A Theory of Justice, 93 performed the same
move with admirable aplomb. He connected the two concepts of fairness and justice intimately
by having the former lead naturally to the latter: If you can understand the demands of fairness, it
91

See Terrell, Turmoil, supra note 41, at 100-01.
I do not at all mean to suggest here that the use of the terms “fairness” and “justice”—by either lawyers or the
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will tell you all you need to know to achieve justice as well—“justice as fairness,” 94 as he
labeled it. Likewise, Gould is contending (without saying so directly, of course) that the obvious
fairness of calling a strike in the precise circumstances of this particular game meant
automatically that the call was consistent with justice as well.
I am dubious about this conclusion, however, for I think the difference between macro and
micro must be taken more seriously. To establish the basis for my attitude, we will need to bring
the values of hypertext more directly into play—which is the job of Part V, infra.
D. Philosophical Context: Moral and Political
Before we make that leap, another half-step is necessary to illustrate the overlap among all
the analytic categories with which this article began. The distinction between micro and macro
perspectives, and between the words fairness and justice, is mirrored in a traditional division
within philosophy as well. The word “traditional” is important here because, although this
separation has long been in the background of normative analysis, it has more recently been
either ignored or denied, as the work of Professor Rawls demonstrates.
Corresponding to the perspective we have thus far labeled micro, and connected to the
concept of fairness, is the realm of “moral” philosophy 95 —the set of values we attach to
interactions on an intimate scale: how you and I should treat each other. On the other hand,
corresponding to the macro-justice perspective is the domain of “social” and, more specifically
for our purposes, “political” philosophy 96 —the set of values pertaining to larger scales of
interaction: how men should treat women; how the institutions of our government should be
arranged and guided; how, in the most general sense, we should govern ourselves. However, just
as there is no evident break in the gradual movement from one end of the earlier “fact pyramid”
to another, there is no clean break between these two philosophical categories. Hence, we should
not be surprised if the separation between them will be challenged (or misperceived) from time
to time. But, the key to note here is that the nature of facts themselves (and of course our
perception and appreciation of them) creates the hierarchy depicted in the pyramid: the top and
bottom of the pyramid are not the same. They are no doubt related, since they are part of the
same hierarchy, but they are not identical. Therefore, we should also not be surprised if there is
significant evidence that the values attached to different levels of the pyramid are also not
identical.
This point will become critical for our understanding of legal reasoning, for lawyers in
particular are continuously confronted with the challenge of operating professionally at both ends
of the pyramid—often, indeed, simultaneously. Lawyers must necessarily attend to the micro,
which is the client paying the bill—or less pejoratively, individuals who need their professional
assistance. But simultaneously, that assistance involves the macro—guidance through the maze
of the legal system, which is itself a part of our larger social and cultural setting. What, then, is
the lawyer’s “proper” perspective: the client or the legal system? 97 Every lawyer always hopes
94

Id. at 11 (“[T]he guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the object of the
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that these two consistently dovetail into convenient and comfortable advice. But every lawyer
will also tell you that they do not. How, then, will the values of hypertext be applied to this
contextual conundrum?
Note the connection again to Gould’s essay. His wonderful sleight-of-hand is to
personalize the story as much as possible, emphasizing individual people in a special one-of-akind setting, but then globalizing his observations and conclusions to the dizzying heights of allencompassing justice. How did he do that? Clearly, he would have made a terrific trial lawyer.
V. THE CHALLENGE OF “OUGHT”: “HYPERTEXT” AS CATEGORICAL AND CONSEQUENTIAL
VALUES
Part of the insight into Gould’s analytic dexterity rests in the next step of connecting
various possible circumstances to an underlying normativity—moving the analysis
straightforwardly from description to justification. Here we finally confront directly, and add
explicitly to legal reasoning, the element so often raised earlier in various forms, but left
hanging—“ought,” normative values, Professor Dworkin’s “best light,” 98 and so on. The analytic
question becomes this: How can an advocate defend her argument, or a court defend its
reasoning, by demonstrating that the contentions or result reflect appropriate respect for the
values and norms of our law and legal system? To develop this aspect of legal reasoning, note,
however, that just as the topics of the previous sections of this article were not, respectively,
“everything about language” and “every possible context,” here, too, the topic is not “everything
you ever wanted to know about philosophy.” Instead, the focus, as it has been relentlessly, is on
reasoning: how we analyze, approach, and apply the abstract subject of values—how we
organize our understanding of normativity. And, more particularly, the examined subjects are not
all possible forms of normative reasoning and organizing, but those efforts that seem most
characteristic of the legal mind.
We discover, once again, that that mind, when approaching, defining, or defending
normative arguments, is analytically split between two fundamental perspectives, which
sometimes complement each other, but sometimes clash and compete. 99 On the one hand, there
are values that are “categorical” (unconditional, universal), like “human dignity” or “treatment as
a moral equal,” and on the other, values that are “consequential” (contingent, result-oriented),
like “increased happiness” or “enhanced economic efficiency.”
A. Distinguishing Categorical From Consequential
This normative dichotomy travels under different labels, all closely related. Philosophers
sometimes debate whether “right” behavior (categorical) determines “good” outcomes
(consequential), or vice versa; or whether deontology (the study of fundamental duties and
related rights) should dominate teleology (the study of social ends), or vice versa; 100 or whether a
priori values (those that somehow pre-existed our current circumstances) are more fundamental
than a posteriori values (those we derive from our experiences), or vice versa. We will here
avoid much of this detail by focusing on the basic point that a normative argument in a case can
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be based either in fundamental values themselves without regard to real-world consequences, or
instead in the idea of a better-functioning community—or both together. The usual indication of
which perspective is in play in a case is whether a claim is labeled “legitimate,” which is code
for categorical, or “reasonable,” which means appropriately consequential.
The question in this segment of legal reasoning is this: Which of these perspectives, if
either, will dominate the forming of an argument or the assessment of a case?
This is rather abstract and abstruse stuff, and it would be nice if, as in other instances in
this article, we could use Professor Gould’s essay as a starting point or introduction. But Gould’s
discussion of the values underlying his analysis and conclusion are so frustratingly obscure and
implicit that it is actually easier to start with a legal example that explicitly struggles with the
distinction between these normative approaches.
Perhaps the easiest legal example of this distinction is the never-ending debate over the
“deep” (that is, fundamental) theory of freedom of speech: Why does the Constitution guarantee
this particular right? 101 It could be because, consequentially (teleologically), freedom of speech
produces a “better” society, all things considered: The reasoning could be that with lots of ideas
out there circulating, we can compare and contrast competing propositions to determine which
produce more praise-worthy or acceptable social results. Or, quite differently, it could be
because, categorically (deontologically), we believe that all citizens are entitled, as a matter of
individual dignity, to express themselves, whether or not what they have to say will be
instrumentally “useful” to anyone.
One standard law school case study of this distinction is the effort by the American Nazi
Party and the Ku Klux Klan to obtain a permit to hold a parade/demonstration down the main
street of Skokie, Illinois—a city well known for having a significant population of survivors of
the Holocaust. 102 What could be more offensive or unproductive? The officials of the city
predictably rejected the application for a permit. But the Nazis and the Klan found an ironic ally:
the American Civil Liberties Union, which challenged the city’s action, and won a significant
victory for them in the federal courts.
The argument by the ACLU was not that their clients had anything useful or appropriate to
say. Instead, it was that as citizens, they were nevertheless entitled, simply as an aspect of their
citizenship within our social and political community, to the inherent human right to express
themselves, even though the vast majority of the community would find their statements not just
worthless, but harmful to our very sense of community in the first place. 103 It was a courageous,
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relentlessly categorical, argument—that freedom of speech was based in values themselves, pure
and simple, and not in any particular outcome produced by the expression. And it was an
argument that cost the ACLU, in the short term, a significant chunk of its membership. 104
Although this is a particularly dramatic example, it is by no means unusual. The constant
struggle in litigation is to determine (hopefully, with the kind of “integrity” identified earlier by
Professor Dworkin) which of the contending parties possesses the requisite “rights” that will
justify a ruling in its favor. The hypertextual question is whether this reasoning should be based
on the categorical values reposed in the arguments of one party or the other, or should it be
grounded in the consequences, either to these parties or to the community more generally, that
will flow from one result or another? Specifically, should the (categorical) value of “dignity” at
the heart of the freedom of speech—a value possessed even by Nazis—prevail, or should we be
more concerned with the quite negative (consequential) impact of the Nazis’ behavior on the
residents of Skokie?
Answers here are by no means obvious—but that is precisely the point. The analysis
described in this article is not, as emphasized throughout, to produce answers and more easily
resolve legal controversies. It is instead to produce better questions—it is a roadmap for either
advocates or judges as they formulate and assess legal arguments. Here, the objective is to reveal
the variation in hypertextual strategies so that one can recognize the important differences in the
value-based claims being made.
In Javins, for example, either of these philosophical perspectives could be used to justify a
result for either party. The case is simple enough: A landlord seeks to evict, or extract money
from, a tenant who has failed to pay rent (indeed, admits readily to doing so). A court could quite
legitimately, according to the analysis of legal reasoning here:
• categorical; landlord wins: emphasize the categorical property rights of the landlord,
which requires respect for the lease agreed to by the tenant that gave the tenant the right to
be on the premises, and imposed on the tenant the responsibility to pay rent; or
• categorical; tenant wins: emphasize the categorical rights to human dignity possessed by
the tenant not to be subjected to inhumane treatment by a powerful landowner, a tenant
who never actually “agreed” to live in squalor; or
• consequential; landlord wins: quite differently, focus on the consequences to the
immediate or larger community in which these parties interact, concluding that a ruling in
favor of the landlord would maintain stability in the housing market, thus benefiting the
social context appropriately; or
• consequential; tenant wins: reason that a ruling for the tenant would force improvements
to be made in the premises available to renters generally, thus also improving social
circumstances.
Or, a court could mix elements of several or all of these approaches. In any event, any of these
outcomes could be said to reflect an effort by the court to put the law involved in its best light,
and thus be a reflection of a court reasoning with “integrity.”
explosive and dangerous situation, enflamed by unforgettable recollections of traumatic experiences in the second
world conflict.”).
104
When it decided to take on the litigation in 1977, the ACLU had 200,000 members nationwide. STRUM, supra
note 102, at 23. Towards the end of the year, as the litigation dragged on and garnered much attention in the press,
the ACLU had lost about 30,000 members, or fifteen percent of its membership. Id. at 82.
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In the Javins case itself, Judge Wright, in holding for the tenant and imposing the implied
warranty of habitability, employed primarily the categorical perspective in the tenant’s favor,
although he seemed to assume that positive consequences would also follow in the local low
income housing market more generally. 105 He reasoned, for example, that the lease must be
interpreted with reference to the “legitimate” 106 (note: not “reasonable”) expectations of the
parties—meaning the expectations of a person entitled to a sense of human dignity seeking
decent shelter, rather than a farmer seeking land to plow. The key for present purposes is to note
that with this approach, Judge Wright did not need any testimony from the tenant herself that
would demonstrate what her “actual” expectations might have been at the time she signed the
lease—that information was now irrelevant. Judge Wright determined that the tenant was entitled
to refuse to pay rent as a matter of, quite simply, categorical values rather than contingent,
specific consequential impacts on the parties.
B. Combining Context and Hypertext
Now, as if things weren’t daunting enough, the analytic circumstances really get
complicated. More is going on in Judge Wright’s assessment of the factual and legal situation in
Javins than just different approaches to values that might be employed. He is evidently also, and
simultaneously, applying any relevant values at different “scales” of reference: Are the keys here
the values to be associated in particular with either Ms. Javins or her landlord, or the values
attributable to the community more generally—tenants as a group, or landlords as a group, or the
wider community of Washington, D.C.?
This additional step obviously links us back to the preceding section’s focus on context:
We noted there that legal reasoning could divide itself between focusing on factual distinctions
or legal distinctions, and that both would be assessed by reference to different scales of analysis,
from micro to macro. Adding hypertext to the mix, we now realize that legal reasoning can quite
straightforwardly produce for any case four different analytical perspectives:
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See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1077 (noting for example that “the nature of today’s urban housing market also dictates
abandonment of the old rule”).
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Id. at 1075.

73

[2012

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

CONTEXT
MICRO

MACRO

CATEGORICAL

Values connected to the parties
are key (e.g., Ms. Javins’s
“dignity”; OR her landlord’s
right to the sanctity of
contractual obligations)

Values associated with the
community are key (e.g.,
tenants as a group seek
something more than just a
place to “exist”; OR landlords
have established a market
based on time-honored
“property rights”)

CONSEQUENTIAL

The impact on the parties is the
key (e.g., Ms. Javins should not
have to live in squalor; OR her
landlord should not suddenly
be forced to operate a business
without cash-flow)

The impact on the larger
community is key (e.g., tenants
will be assured that the
available housing stock will not
be disgusting; OR landlords
will not be burdened with new
responsibilities that will cause
them to leave the market, and
hence make the housing
shortage
for
low-income
tenants worse)

HYPERTEXT

Note how challenging this picture is: Each of these perspectives can be the basis for a ruling in
favor of either of the parties. The point here—to emphasize it once again—is not that the process
of legal reasoning will generate any particular result, but that it can generate a range of
legitimate outcomes. Most importantly, that range can be identified and predicted in advance,
and hence be the basis for careful legal analysis and argument. This is the key, I would argue, to
“sophisticated” lawyering. 107
C. Back to Professor Gould
Professor Gould’s essay can now be seen as another impressive example of this skillful
mixing of context and hypertext to produce a desired result and make it look eminently
reasonable. Beyond the circumstances of the World Series game itself, values certainly matter
critically to his defense of Pinelli’s call, for he invokes nothing less than “justice” to vindicate
him—indeed, a sense of justice grounded in our deepest American political justification of
“democracy.” But, where did Gould’s normativity come from, and what is its nature and
structure? Unfortunately, Gould only asserts these values and their relevance rather than trying to
prove the point, so we will have to do some speculating and filling here to round out the
argument.
Gould seems rather obviously to emphasize the categorical over the consequential. His
argument is apparently that the unique circumstances of that particular game—the World
Series—combine with the unique virtues of dignity, human struggle, and the striving for
excellence to produce a clearly justified outcome. The values critical to him seem rooted in
democracy. He asserts, indeed emphasizes, that the event must be viewed from the political
107

This has been my argument throughout a series of articles analyzing the nature of philosophical and legal
disagreement. See supra notes 41, 49, and 53.
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theory perspective that “single acts of greatness are intrinsic spurs to democracy”—that is, that
our democracy’s most basic normative assumption—“rule by the people”—is justified by our
abiding assumption that anyone among us is capable of an heroic act. Equality, then, upon which
democracy is based, is ironically, but powerfully, rooted in the unequal: individual behavior
worthy of praise and admiration. Thus, it is important that the pitcher of this perfect game is not
a great baseball star, but an ordinary Joe called upon to produce a brilliant performance over the
course of an entire game, in contrast to the momentary pinch-hit batter. In this situation of
extraordinary pressure at the culmination of extraordinary effort, the “law” of baseball—to be
decided by the umpire, not by a jury of players or fans or anyone else—would have to be, would
it not, that the batter bears a special burden—he must “swing at anything close.” Just as Gould
says, “[t]ruth is a circumstance [this special game as a whole], not a spot [the particular pitch and
its precise location].”
Now we can see all the factors in Professor Gould’s reasoning come into play. The
definition of a strike depends upon separating the physical facts from the normative values at
stake; those values must in turn be assessed within the proper context, which is micro in
character, focusing on the extraordinary event of this particular World Series game and its final
inning when the law of baseball itself may undergo a shift; and in this narrow and unusual
circumstance, the hypertextual values that are key are therefore not consequential in nature, since
the ramifications of the umpire’s call in this singular game will necessarily be quite limited in
scope and future relevance to the game of baseball generally, but instead categorical, as Gould
links the event to our most fundamental moral and political norms.
This result is by no means inevitable, of course. Reasonable people could disagree at each
analytical point along this journey. For example, at the final stage of invoking fundamental
values, one could argue that Gould’s connection between democracy and heroism is misplaced.
A different approach is illustrated in Bertolt Brecht’s play The Life of Galileo” 108 in which one of
Galileo’s students criticizes him for succumbing to the pressure of the Catholic Church to recant
his scientific findings in exchange for his life. The student laments, “Unhappy the land that has
no heroes!” 109 After further chastisement by the student, the scene ends with the student, now ill
with disappointment, being helped from the stage, and Galileo responds quietly: “Unhappy the
land that is in need of heroes.” 110 Perhaps this is the problem with Gould’s praise of Pinelli: It
misapprehends, one could say, the very nature of our civil society, which depends for its deep
justification not on the occasional extraordinary act by impressive individuals, but on the vast
bulk of ordinary behavior by people humble enough to expect to be treated with equal dignity no
matter what the circumstances. Thus, the focus of our attention at that World Series game should
not be on Don Larson, the glorified pitcher, but Dale Mitchell, the forgotten pinch-hitter, who is
entitled to just as much respect.
The point here is not, however, that Gould got it wrong, for the analysis in this article does
not depend on any particular conclusion about Pinelli’s call. The point instead, as it has been
from the beginning, is simply the reasoning behind our assessment of the call. With careful
attention to the elements of that process, one should be able to see more clearly the layers within
the thinking of Professor Gould or Judge Wright or anyone else presenting a “legal” argument.
The matter at stake is therefore, as noted earlier, only indirectly the presentation of sophisticated
legal answers; it is more directly the effort to develop the sophisticated legal questions that lie
108
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“under” or “before” those answers. At its most practical and instrumental, then, this article is
about listening to an opponent’s contentions carefully to identify spots of weakness and strength.
It is the essence of “thinking like a lawyer.”
VI. SUBTEXT: THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF JUDICIAL “DISCRETION” WITHIN POLITICAL
THEORY, AND A RETURN TO CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS
But a last step in this process of unpacking legal reasoning is evidently missing. All things
considered, Professor Gould’s essay ends quite oddly. Having mounted a spirited and impressive
defense of Pinelli’s called third strike, Gould nevertheless acknowledges that the famed umpire
returned to the locker room after the game “and cried.” If, according to Gould, Pinelli was so
“correct” in that call, why would he do so? Has Gould just been kidding throughout his essay,
knowing all along that Pinelli was in fact quite wrong in making that call—and indeed knew that
he was wrong? Or is there a final twist to the story that we need to add? Could the tears indicate,
in other words, the recognition by Pinelli not of a personal momentary mistake, but of a deeper,
more profound institutional mistake impacting the game of baseball itself?
A. Subtext: Psychological vs. Institutional Explanations
Students are split on the explanation for Pinelli’s emotional reaction after the game. Most
seem to believe that Gould is correct in his positive assessment of Pinelli’s call, and that Pinelli
knew he had decided correctly, all things considered. But the tears, they believe, came from the
extraordinary pressure of the moment. This was, after all, a fabled moment of the only perfect
game in World Series history, and likely the only one ever to be pitched, and it was that unique
circumstance that simply overcame him when he had a chance to pause and reflect. It was a
release, pure and simple. Others, however, believe that Pinelli broke down because he knew that,
because of the pressure of the moment, he had gotten it (technically) wrong. He had called a
strike not because the pitch was “in fact” a strike, but because, in the intense pressure of the
moment, he made the call he wanted to make—to give Don Larson his perfect game—but not the
call the rules of baseball directed him to make. Thus, he had failed in his responsibilities as an
umpire (by acting arbitrarily), and indeed failed when it mattered with particular gravity. From
this perspective, his only defense, of course, would be that he believed, along with Gould, that
the pitch should be a strike—that Larson somehow (categorically) deserved the strike call, and
deserved it more than the batter deserved a technically accurate call. But that convenient move
into hypertext isn’t consistent with his tears. Perhaps, then, he recognized the thinness of this
value-based façade, and was simply, and appropriately, ashamed for having made such an
inaccurate call in front of the entire baseball world.
Unfortunately, neither of these competing explanations can ever be proven to anyone’s
satisfaction, which means that the issue will forever remain frustratingly in doubt. But this is not
where the matter should be left. Another perspective is possible that, while no more certain
descriptively or psychologically, does provide a kind of analytic satisfaction—a version of
closure, if you will, on our connection of Umpire Pinelli to the world of judicial decisionmaking. Rather than attempt to explain Pinelli’s tears in the limited form of either emotional
catharsis or embarrassment for a specific mistake, we could (and should) connect his response to
our foundations of context and hypertext—by blending them into another, separate element
within our topic of legal reasoning. In doing so, we will, at long last, return to, and appreciate in
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a new way, the remark made by Chief Justice John Roberts, noted at the beginning of this essay,
about the judge’s job being merely to “call the balls and strikes.”
Pinelli’s reaction may, for our purposes here, be understood best not as a reflection of
personal angst, but of a larger and more profound professional regret on his part: His tears could
reflect his realization that the key importance of his call was not whether it was “right” nor
“wrong” in any sense we have thus far identified—that is, whether the pitch was a strike
according to the baseball rule book (text), or because the social or cultural circumstances of the
game (context) said so, or because the deeper values of the game (hypertext) justified the label.
Instead, and quite differently, he may have been—and perhaps should have been—upset when he
realized that the call was questionable institutionally, concerning his role in the game as an
umpire—what I will label the analytical element of “subtext:” From this perspective, the issue in
his mind would not have been the narrow issue of “strikes” and “balls” as such, but more
profoundly the concept of umpiring itself—the nature of the difficult task of decision making he
was required to accomplish. Perhaps he realized that, despite the comfort offered by Professor
Gould’s defense of his call, he had made an error independent of (perhaps even “deeper” than)
the call itself.
What he might have regretted was his violation, as almost he alone could have perceived it,
of his function as a “judicial” arbiter within baseball disputes. It was not his eyesight or his
reasoning that had gone astray. Instead, it was his mishandling of his professional status of a
decision maker operating with some degree of discretion 111 which had caused him in turn to
impact the game inappropriately—in fact, to redefine the game itself. The dislocation he may
have perceived he had introduced was not, then, linguistic or circumstantial or normative—it was
political.
This is a subtle but important point within the complex topic of legal reasoning, and one
we have yet to face directly in this essay. But again we have a convenient analytical bridge that
will allow us to see the link between the difficult circumstances faced by Umpire Pinelli and
those confronted by judges on a regular basis.
B. “Scorer’s Discretion” and a Positivist Approach to Judging
The perspective we need is provided by H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law, which
continues to be, even after almost half a century, the single best development of a “positivist”
approach to law and legal systems. Hart’s perspective rigorously denies that law needs a
foundation in any particular set of moral values to be valid and effective. 112 At an early point in
his argument about the proper way to imagine how legal systems develop sociologically, 113
111

In a return to the problem of the inherent differences between decision making in baseball and the law first
discussed in note 7, supra, this idea of “discretion” actually reinforces the similarities of the two contexts. Anyone
who has played baseball at a significant level will recall a coach or manager yelling to a batter: “Protect the plate!
Protect the plate!” (usually followed by something like “You moron!”). What the coach is acknowledging is the
inherent human fallibility that will characterize the umpire’s effort to call balls and strikes: The pitches are fast and
the margins are small. The batter must assume, then, that the “discretion” that will be exercised by the umpire may
well be disadvantageous, and pitches at the margins will therefore have to be scrutinized carefully and defensively.
By the same token, lawyers advising clients always know that a judge’s discretion in contested situations may well
be exercised in a direction the lawyer and client do not like, and they too will “protect the plate” in the sense of
structuring their circumstances as carefully as possible to avoid these marginal situations. Litigators will
nevertheless, of course, always portray their positions as not marginal at all, but “straight down the middle.”
112
HART, supra note 12.
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Professor Hart’s agenda was to describe how a legal system, and hence law, came into being, not to justify any
particular aspect of a given set of laws. Id. at 17 (“[The purpose of the book] is to advance legal theory by providing
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Professor Hart suggested an example drawn, conveniently for us, from sports. Imagine a game—
soccer, cricket, baseball, whatever—that is being played. The game has players that can claim
they are playing the game because they have a set of shared rules in their heads that define the
nature of the game, including what they are trying to accomplish within this competitive and
cooperative environment, what actions are permitted and forbidden to the players, and so on
(what Hart labeled an “internal point of view” about the game). The game can continue as such,
and be enjoyed, as long as the players simply know, and agree among themselves, what these
rules and expectations are. Disputes about violations of the rules will certainly arise from time to
time, but as long as the players can work things out, again simply among themselves, the game
will be able to proceed.
To this familiar, uncomplicated picture, Professor Hart added another element and posed
a challenging question: What would happen to the game if an “official scorer” 114 of some kind
became the arbiter of issues involving the game’s rules? Does the nature of the game itself stay
the same, or does it change significantly, shifting from its original soccer or cricket to what Hart
called “scorer’s discretion” 115? Surely it is supposed to remain the same game, with the same
rules and expectations, but now with an improved method of resolving disputes.
Hart’s point, of course, was that this common sense observation was consistent with, and
helped confirm, the positivist perspective about the nature of a society’s legal system: Just as the
most basic rules of—and intrinsic values within—a game develop and are accepted among the
players before there is a referee or umpire designated to help make them behave properly, so too
the most basic values characterizing a community (its internal point of view) develop before
there are any judges designated to resolve disputes. In Professor Hart’s terminology, “primary
rules of obligation” 116 precede the invention of “secondary rules” 117 that help resolve disputes
about the nature and application of the primary rules—that is, the rules that guide umpires and
judges as they make decisions. “Official scorers,” then, do not—and should not—normatively
an improved analysis of the distinctive structure of a municipal legal system and a better understanding of the
resemblances and differences between law, coercion, and morality, as types of social phenomena.”) The book is
therefore much more a sophisticated piece of sociology than philosophy. The following sequence of footnotes
concerning Professor Hart’s text are necessarily very summary and limited, intended only to connect this article’s
discussion to certain basic (rather than all of the) analytic concepts within his rich description of law and legal
systems.
114
Id. at 142 (“Like the changes from a regime of custom to a mature system of law, the addition to the game of
secondary rules providing for the institution of a scorer whose rulings are final, brings into the system a new kind of
internal statement; for unlike the players’ statements as to the score, the scorer’s determinations are given, by
secondary rules, a status that renders them unchallengeable.”).
115
Id. (“There might indeed be a game with such a rule, and some amusement might be found in playing it if the
scorer’s discretion were exercised with some regularity; but it would be a different game. We may call such a game
the game of ‘scorer’s discretion.’”); id. at 144 (“Up to a certain point, the fact that some rulings given by a scorer are
plainly wrong is not inconsistent with the game continuing . . . . The fact that isolated or exceptional official
aberrations are tolerated does not mean that the game of cricket or baseball is no longer being played. On the other
hand, if these aberrations are frequent, or if the scorer repudiates the scoring rule, there must come a point when
either the players no longer accept the scorer’s aberrant rulings or, if they do, the game has changed. It is no longer
cricket or baseball but ‘scorer’s discretion’ . . . .”).
116
Id. at 98 (“Under the simple regime of primary rules [legal guidance] is manifested in its simplest form, in the use
of . . . rules as the basis of criticism, and the justification of demands for conformity, social pressure, and
punishment. Reference to this most elementary manifestation of [legal guidance] is required for the analysis of the
basic concepts of obligation and duty.”).
117
Id. at 98-99 (“With the addition to the system of secondary rules, the range of what is said and done [legally] is
much extended and diversified. . . . These include the notions of legislation, jurisdiction, validity, and, generally, of
legal powers, private and public.”).
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transform the game; instead, they simply inherit whatever game they have been instructed to
observe.
Judges, by the same token, from Hart’s perspective, inherit the legal system that preceded
them as well. They do not have an independent normative foundation from which to impose
improvements upon the society that has designated them as decision makers. The moral content,
or lack of such content, of any of the rules of their society should not matter to any judge doing
his or her job appropriately. The rules are simply the rules, to be applied to the facts as
straightforwardly as humanly possible, no matter how uncomfortable or unfortunate those
directions may be from the judge’s own personal perspective. Perhaps the most extreme version
of this approach, not surprisingly rendered from a civil law perspective, 118 comes from
Montesquieu: Judicial judgments are to be “fixed to such a degree that they are never anything
but a precise text of the law.” 119 Judges were “only the mouth that pronounces the words of the
law, inanimate beings who can moderate neither its force nor its rigor.” 120 Thus, judicial power
becomes “invisible and null.” 121
This would seem, then, to be the perspective offered by then-Judge Roberts in his remark
during his confirmation hearings: He is simply a good, old-fashioned positivist, understanding
the task of judging as letting the game of life proceed as it will, making “calls” occasionally in
disputed or close moments when an independent eye is necessary, but otherwise not insinuating
himself into the contest. “Life,” then—in all its social, political, legal, and moral complication—
remains the same, basic game it was before he (like all judges) arrived on the scene. No
independent element of “discretion” has been introduced to alter it meaningfully.
This would seem to be a happy, comfortable, and, above all, politically legitimate
resolution of the issue. But our questions here now become these: Is this reasoning, and positivist
defense (i.e., “these are the pre-existing rules and I have no institutional authority to ignore or
change them”) available to Pinelli—and by extension, to Chief Justice Roberts? Did Pinelli’s
called third strike permit baseball to remain baseball, or had he transformed it, even for just a
moment, into “scorer’s discretion”? Had he injected himself into the game as an independent
force or variable that made him a “player” as well? But most important of all: If we conclude that
he had indeed become a part of the game, is that necessarily wrong, as the positivist approach
seems to maintain?
C. Varying Perspectives on Institutional Subtext
At this point, you should not be surprised to learn that (at least) three possible approaches
to this issue are immediately evident, each based on the analytic perspectives developed earlier:
text, context and hypertext. As the assessments of Pinelli’s call progress from harshest to kindest,
they offer different explanations for Pinelli’s tears after the game. In turn, they each offer
different assessments of whether the “scorer’s discretion” analysis is available as a defense for
then-Judge Roberts’ remark.
118

The distinction between civil law and common law systems can be summarized thus: “The common law has its
source in previous court decisions. The main traditional source of the common law is therefore not legislation but
cases. . . . In civil law countries, cases are simply not a source of law—at least not in theory. . . . Civil law jurists
tend to see the civil code as an all-encompassing document.” JANE S. GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS 66, 69-70 (rev.
2d ed. 2004).
119
CHARLES DE SECONDAT DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 158 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller &
Harold S. Stone trans. and eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
120
Id. at 163.
121
Id. at 158.
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1. Pinelli and the Supposed Primacy of Baseball’s “Text”
First, perhaps Pinelli realized that he had indeed erred in a profoundly political way
because, by failing to apply the rule of strikes in the manner contemplated by baseball’s
rulebook, he had altered the game itself—indeed, in its most celebrated and venerated moments
in a World Series game. He had, in effect, transformed the game from one of exacting, consistent
expectations and demonstrated skill, to one of approximation (“close is good enough”), suddenly
uneven demands (“batters must swing defensively, rather than pitchers must pitch accurately”),
and endorsed paltry performance even though based on earlier skillful performance (“given all
your earlier good pitches, I’ll let you get away with a few bad ones”). From this perspective,
Professor Gould’s defense of Pinelli on the basis of the supposed unwritten rule that “batters
must swing at anything close in a big game” was actually nothing more than a thinly veiled
rationalization for his error and an excuse probably based in Gould’s biased attitude toward the
outcome of the game. Perhaps Pinelli thought the call made him look biased as well: Maybe he
had always harbored favoritism toward the Yankees, and it emerged most evidently in that
particular moment. Or, maybe he had, over the course of the game, developed sympathy for
Larson personally because of the pitcher’s superior performance up to that point. In either event,
despite Gould’s attempt at praise, Pinelli’s tears of embarrassment would be both explainable
and justifiable, based on his non-umpire-like method of defining a strike.
And, as noted above, perhaps this would be Judge, now Chief Justice, Roberts’s
perspective as well. His theory of judging, at its most fundamental, could be that judges should
conscientiously avoid “interfering” in the social milieu they have been asked to assess from time
to time by introducing elements extrinsic to that setting. They should take the text of the rules
they must apply as the key to their decision making. The other analytic factors of context and
hypertext—of circumstances and values—may certainly come into play simply because the
judge will be human and will consider in some background sense whether the “specialness” of
the game or any of the players should make any sort of difference, or whether the game has an
underlying normative dimension that would justify a modification of the usual rules. But these
elements would be perceived as the interlopers they are, sneaking into an analysis that should
instead remain focused on the consistent application of the pre-existing, announced rules of the
game. The “life” of baseball should not be altered just because umpires have been hired to call
the balls and strikes. 122
Examining the opinions of then-Judge Roberts reveals much evidence of this approach.
When confronted with the problem of defining an important word or phrase in a text—a statute,
of course, given the Court on which he was serving—Judge Roberts never, as far as I can
determine, launched into the kind of creative, multi-factored analysis pursued by Judge Wright in
Javins. To the contrary, if a text did not reveal its own meaning on its face, he regularly simply
turned to another text: a dictionary. For example, to define “action for money damages” 123 and
“complaint,” 124 he turned to Black’s Law Dictionary; to define “divert,” 125 he employed Black’s
122

I readily concede that this description of Chief Justice Roberts’s thought process is remarkably politically neutral,
if not friendly. It does not acknowledge that his thinking may be much more related to a conservative social and
legal agenda of much controversy. That kind of assessment, however, is well beyond the scope and purpose of this
article.
123
Amoco Production Co. v. Watson, 410 F.3d 722, 733 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
124
Id.
125
PDK Laboratories Inc. v. U.S.D.E.A., 362 F.3d 786, 801 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the decision).
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and the Oxford English Dictionary. The fact that dictionaries can have disagreements among
themselves would not seem to matter much, since whatever differences they may have would
introduce less flexibility and controversy into the situation than a judge turning to sources as
broad and unanchored as context or values.
In circumstances in which neither “plain text” nor a dictionary would (relatively) settle the
matter of meaning, Judge Roberts would, in statutory interpretation circumstances, turn to the
traditional limiting factor of the statute’s “purpose.” 126 Although this would seem to open a door
to a much wider and richer inquiry, Judge Roberts never found any serious difficulty in divining
Congress’s direction. Even though a reference to “purpose” would necessarily send us outside
the strict confines of “text”—which would suggest disconcertingly that context and hypertext
would inevitably seep into the analysis—by focusing on Congress’s supposed purpose, any
circumstances or values that might be invoked to give meaning to any words would be
Congress’s, not his. No significant independent inquiry on his part would be necessary. 127
Similarly, Judge Roberts certainly acknowledged in a couple of cases 128 that the words of a
statute could indeed be broad and ambiguous, leading to challenges in their interpretation. The
explanation for this phenomenon lies again in the concept of legislative “purpose,” for Congress
had apparently meant just that: a breadth of discretionary results: “The fact that a statute can be
applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity, it
demonstrates breadth.” 129 “The Supreme Court has consistently instructed that statutes written in
broad, sweeping language should be given broad, sweeping application.” 130 But in both these
instances, this looseness in the law did not trouble him, for the discretion created by the statute
did not apply to him (meaning the judiciary), but to administrative officials who would use this
breadth of authority to create and apply regulations that would fill in these “gaps” in the law.
Hence, his (balls-and-strikes) “call” remained easy: The question was only whether others had
discretion and had exercised it legitimately. Perhaps their judgment “calls” would now reach out
beyond text to context and hypertext, but that was equally untroubling because Congress had
implicitly endorsed that approach for these non-judicial actors.
None of these examples would seem to be of much comfort to Umpire Pinelli, however.
Baseball’s “text” on strikes seems rather clear, with no discretionary breadth. Dictionaries will
not add anything to the analysis. A resort to “purpose” would seem disingenuous and selfserving: There is no one to whom Pinelli could delegate the call who might be able to
legitimately exercise the discretion he so much seems to want to apply. Judge Roberts’s
approach as applied to Pinelli, then, would lead to nothing but the conclusion that the umpire
simply got it wrong (by introducing considerations extrinsic to the textual definition of strike),
pure and simple. Tears of professional embarrassment would, in turn, be appropriate.

126

See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. F.C.C., 394 F.3d 933, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that “[t]he whole purpose of the
tariff provision in question was to ensure that benefits could not be transferred without concomitant obligations”).
127
I also recognize that this discussion of statutory interpretation is, as a general matter, quite quick and superficial.
But the nuances in this realm of legal reasoning are beyond the more basic scope and purpose of this article. For
those who might be interested in digging deeper here, I will note that I have developed this topic at length from an
analytic perspective very similar to the structured approach advanced here. See Terrell, Epistemology, supra note 41.
128
See, e.g., In re England, 375 F.3d 1169, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
129
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 689 (2001).
130
Consumer Elecs. Ass’n v. F.C.C., 347 F.3d 291, 298 (D.C. Cir 2003). Judge Roberts cited to both Consumer
Elecs. Ass’n and PGA Tour in In re England to rebut arguments for a narrow application of a federal statutory
provision that were based on a plain language reading of the provision. In re England, 375 F.3d at 1179.
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To avoid this harsh conclusion—to supply other, kinder explanations for Pinelli’s
emotional catharsis—we must therefore employ other elements of legal reasoning: We must
develop more carefully the “is” and “ought” of Pinelli’s political role in the game. Perhaps
alternative perspectives lie in viewing Pinelli’s role not as extrinsic to baseball—that is, as
somehow outside this milieu—but as intrinsic to it—that is, as directly part of, and necessary to,
the game itself. That will require resort to context and hypertext, either of which can nevertheless
be the source of angst leading to tears.
2. Context: Pinelli and the Ambiguity of the Game’s “Circumstances”
As a second possibility for assessing whether Pinelli misbehaved as an umpire, we might
become much more sympathetic to Professor Gould’s praise of the called third strike if we were
able to examine much more carefully and thoroughly the facts of the game itself—meaning the
way baseball is actually played from the sandlot to the professional ranks, and in ordinary games
all the way to the World Series—what we noted earlier Professor Hart called the “internal point
of view.” We might discover (or at least conclude to our satisfaction) that Gould is correct as a
psychological matter concerning the expectations of the players involved—that players do
indeed anticipate that in a situation like that faced by Umpire Pinelli, the pitcher does get a break
of some unknown number of inches in the strike zone. This would then allow Pinelli to root his
call in what scholars of, for example, property law and international law (and indeed, what
Professor Hart would attribute as a feature to English law generally) would readily recognize as
“custom:” 131 an unwritten, but nevertheless existing and legitimate, part of the “rules” of the
game. The “customary law” of baseball might then include, just as Gould argued, this “rule” that
“in a big game, at key moments, batters must swing at anything close.”
While this certainly makes Pinelli’s actions less arbitrary and more institutionally
acceptable, troubling questions nevertheless linger: When does the usual definition of a strike
shift? What is “close enough” to justify a strike call? Part of the job of the umpire would then
seem to be to exercise the authority to decide these difficult points whenever necessary. But in
the absence of widespread and articulable agreement on these important details, we would seem
to be back to the world of “scorer’s discretion” where the game is at the mercy of the potential
arbitrariness of a non-player. Baseball becomes “whatever the umpire says is baseball.”
Nevertheless, this could be what the players and fans in fact expect: In difficult game
situations, a certain amount of arbitrariness is simply unavoidable. Pinelli’s call was not, then,
really either “right” or “wrong”— it was just a decision he had to make where he had been given
the authority to make it. The “customary law” of baseball was that the umpire, from time to time,
would have to identify these occasional unwritten rules, perceive their relevance, and apply them
at the appropriate moments.
But with such a happy defense, why would Pinelli cry after the game? Here, we actually
return to the favorite explanation of the law students: All the ambiguity surrounding these
customs could be the basis for serious decisional angst, for difficult questions now abound. Does
the supposed custom actually exist? Do players actually have this particular expectation about
131

For an example of the use of custom as law in the United States, see, e.g., State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d
671, 676-79 (Or. 1969) (using English doctrine of custom to create public rights in dry sand areas of coastal
beaches). For discussions of custom in international law, see, e.g., ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971), and THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW (Amanda Perreau-Saussine &
James B. Murphy eds., 2007). Indeed, Professor Hart argued that custom was a fundamental feature of English law
generally. See HART, supra note 12, at 44-48.
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variations from this particular (otherwise written) rule? Did the umpire apply this variation well,
and in the appropriate moment, or did he or she go too far? Or not far enough? The more that
reasonable people can disagree on any of these points, the more pressure Pinelli could have felt
about the weightiness of his decision—about whether he was just “calling” the game, or altering
it. Emotional release in such a “politically” charged circumstance would seem quite reasonable.
In turn, that pressure could be relevant to the apparent reluctance of Justice Roberts to push
his view of judging beyond the text of the rules. The search for unwritten forms of guidance is
scary and dangerous, for it infuses the “official scorer” into the game in important ways that the
players and observers may not fully appreciate. These participants may think they know the
nature of the game they are playing, but at crucial moments, they could be wrong—and wrong in
ways that they would not have been able to look up in any text anywhere. The argument by a
defender of Umpire Pinelli would be that if these players had been paying attention
appropriately, they would have known about these subtle variations, and have known that they
might be imposed, so nothing “unfair” has occurred. But it seems troubling, does it not, that a
judge—an official arbiter of the rules, rather than an actual rule-maker—has the authority to
identify, define, and apply these rules that have never otherwise been officially adopted by the
relevant community.
So Professor Gould was right—although Chief Justice Roberts would presumably
disagree—when he observed that baseball “truth” isn’t a spot; it’s a “circumstance.” There is a
“range” of truthful strikes into which Pinelli could insert himself, just as a judge can be “in the
neighborhood” of justice. And an important judicial task then becomes determining the scope of
that expected and accepted discretion. Chief Justice Roberts’s statement about “balls and strikes”
therefore could be seen as rather disingenuous if by it he meant that a “range” of possible
decisions facing a judge 132 does not exist—that rules are rules are rules, without meaningful
variation available in their application—or that, despite the fact that rules can be messy, the job
of a judge is nevertheless to perceive and ground each decision in rulebook-like “certainty.” That
is a daunting political image for the judiciary to aspire to portray. Is it also dishonest?
3. Hypertext: Vindicating Pinelli Through Baseball’s Values
A third perspective from which to determine whether Pinelli’s call was an example of good
or bad umpiring, in and of itself, also draws on something potentially intrinsic, rather than
extrinsic, to baseball: the deeper normative values that are a constituent part of the game. Why
does baseball exist, particularly at a professional level, and continue to be such an integral part of
our culture? It is at least, in part, because of its celebration of athletic excellence (indeed,
excellence that can be measured with the exactness of calculations to three decimal points), the
individual integrity (usually) and personal investment of those who play, the teamwork that is
nevertheless necessary for success, the history and continuity of the game, the strategy and
intelligence that is necessary to win games at the highest levels, and so on. What is interesting
here is that there seems to be an additional, subtle element that is integral—unavoidably
necessary—to achieving all of these values, something beyond the players themselves, or the
venues in which they play, or the fans that flock to watch: It is the umpires. The more
“important” the game—that is, the more critical to the appreciation of the game the elements of
excellence and integrity and strategy and so on become—the more the game requires an “official
132

“Range,” as Chief Justice Roberts uses the term here, arguably translates into the area (as opposed to a single spot
or one-dimensional line) of “integrity” in the graph appearing earlier in this Article that I derived from Professor
Dworkin’s theories and analysis. See supra note 83.

83

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2012

scorer” to become involved to endorse these feats formally for the historical record, rather than
anecdotally among friends. Sandlot games, in other words, are one thing, while professional
games are something else altogether. These two contexts are not, in fact, the same game, in a
normative, value-laden sense.
This observation now becomes the true basis on which Pinelli’s call can be either justified
or condemned—not just “explained” as a rational act. The argument would be, from this
hypertextual perspective, that the game of baseball itself, at this higher level, has become a game
dependent on the presence of, and the decision-making authority of, umpires. The values
inherent in the game demand that this extra “player” be introduced to the situation: Without
umpires, the professional game in particular cannot sufficiently manifest the values it needs to
remain the game we have come to respect. Thus, the game of baseball has become altered by the
addition of “official scorers,” not because the scorers have forced or remolded it into a new form
of “scorer’s discretion,” but because the values of excellence and integrity and the like at this
very high level of expectation cannot be adequately and appropriately appreciated and
implemented without them.
Understood in this way, umpires do, and are expected to do, much more than just “call the
balls and strikes.” They exist to make certain that the values that keep the game alive and well
are manifested in the way the game is being played. Part of their responsibility would, therefore,
obviously be to follow the “rules” of the game as articulated in the text of its official rulebook—
but that is only a part. The additional question would always be whether the particular
application of any given rule in a particular context is consistent with the long-term normative
health of the game, or whether a variation on the rule, widely but perhaps not perfectly
perceived, would be better for the game overall.
This is apparently what Professor Gould meant when he characterized Pinelli’s call as not
just respectable (as grounded in some existing “custom”), but “his finest, his most perceptive, his
most truthful moment.” The call was, for Gould, the vindication of the umpire’s role itself. It was
a reflection of an umpire carrying on the deepest, most important traditions of the game,
recognizing that the key values of baseball could, in the right instances, determine the “rules” by
which the game would be played. “Truth” in baseball—those normative elements that sustain
it—is therefore indeed both a “circumstance” (a variable context) and “inviolable” (a constant
categorical norm). In the end then, if the values remain the same even if their applications vary,
hypertext can be the dominant decision-grounding factor.
Why, then, Pinelli’s tears, if he got it so right? That’s precisely the problem: How would
he know, in this pressure-packed moment, that he had gotten it right? With something as abstract,
and undoubtedly controversial, as baseball’s values as stake, how could he assure himself that he
had made the correct call? Others could argue just as vociferously as Professor Gould that Pinelli
got it exactly wrong: In the game’s toughest moments, the job of the umpire is to apply the rules
of the game as rigorously, technically, and carefully as possible. The umpire is not to get swept
up in the emotional circumstances of the Big Game, but to remain aloof and judicious, to keep
even this Game within the best traditions of the sport. The strike zone should not vary for either
the pitcher or the batter, but remain relentlessly consistent, as baseball’s values of excellence,
integrity, and respect require.
The tears, then, represent doubt—not about the “accuracy” of the call, but about whether it
was the most appropriate, the most professional, call that could have been made. Did he have the
values right, or had he done something that would hurt the game? Which values were the more
important: those of the game in some general and amorphous sense, or those of treating the
84
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individual players fairly and with respect? Did others see the unique context of this World Series
moment the way he did, and particularly the way that context impacted the vales of baseball?
Would others understand and appreciate his “creative,” contextual, perhaps “customary”
approach to the rulebook’s definition of a strike? These are tough, difficult, worrisome issues,
the kind that vindicate Soren Kierkegaard’s famous, but seemingly exaggerated, observation that
moments of decision are “moments of madness.” 133 They are the moments when all the elements
of reasoning come together—perhaps more accurately, crash together—simultaneously. For
those who must make contested, close decisions on a regular basis, this makes for serious
professional angst.
D. From Umpires to Judges: And a Renewed Appreciation for “Judicial Independence”
Which returns us to the connection between Pinelli’s plight and the debate about the nature
of judging. Now the issue is fully formed, for surely this complex analysis of decision making is
controversial on several fronts when it is expanded beyond the realm of the game of baseball. It
is one thing to perceive umpires as permitted—as a matter of the institutional “political”
structure of baseball—to unearth from the game they observe the values that are intrinsic and
critical to it, and make judgments based thereon; it is quite another to imagine permitting judges
the same range of political authority to examine society from their vantage points behind the
bench to find the values that are similarly essential to civil society, and thus determine the way in
which they will apply society’s “law” to its citizens. But this is the essential political issue: One
might well argue that the role of the judiciary should be much more limited and circumspect,
focused on finding facts and applying law determined by our texts. If a rule needs to be modified
to handle an unusual situation more acceptably, it is up to other political actors, with more
political accountability, to make that change. This is the only way to ensure that our civil life
does not become a version of “scorer’s discretion.”
But despite the reasonable modesty of this approach to the issue, it fails to capture an
important nuance within the debate that must be confronted. No doubt “social life” as a general
proposition could certainly go on whether or not we have judges available to adjudicate disputes,
as indeed human interaction in all its forms preceded the existence of any formal judiciary. Thus,
in the absence of judges, people would still buy and sell, eat and sleep, love and hate, and
everything else we do. But could civil life, certainly in any modern form as we have come to
understand and expect it, continue in anything like an acceptable form without the presence and
participation of judicial arbiters? Would our economy still function, our interactions remain
constrained, our communities continue to operate in a supportive manner, if we did not have—
not just police to arrest wrongdoers—but also an accepted, legitimate form of settling disputes
among us—some guidance, in effect, about the use of the police? I don’t think anyone could
reasonably argue that these fundamental features of ordinary life would survive meaningfully.
Indeed, I would argue that the United States, as a political community, abandoned the view
of a limited, myopic, super-neutral set of judicial “scorers” well over two hundred years ago. The
133

Although this phrase is often attributed to Kierkegaard by other philosophers, like Jacques Lacan and Jacques
Derrida, among others, its precise location within Kierkegaard’s own work is notoriously difficult to pin down. See,
e.g., Geoffrey Bennington, A Moment of Madness: Derrida’s Kierkegaard, 33 OXFORD LITERARY REV. 103 (2011).
It is no doubt drawn from Fear and Trembling. See generally S. KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING (Walter
Lawrie trans., 1941). Derrida’s use of Kierkegaard in Force of Law is typical: All we get is “The instant of decision
is madness, says Kierkegaard.” Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 919, 967 (1990) (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990).
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Constitution did not assume, as had the Articles of Confederation, 134 that the existing, local,
traditional judiciary—the kind that assisted in the assessing and settling of occasional disputes—
was sufficient to address the kind of disagreements that would arise in the future. To the
contrary, the Framers foresaw that national-level disputes would doubtless arise, and resolving
them would require a judiciary adequate to this more challenging task. 135 Not surprisingly, then,
that political entity was established by the same fundamental document as the rest of the new
national government. By the same token, all states have established their own supreme courts to
perform the same critical task. This must mean that this country’s political “game” included
“scorers” from the very beginning—not for the purpose of imposing themselves on the game and
transforming it as they pleased, but to be part and parcel of the action that would become modern
life. The more challenging this game would become, the more important a thoughtful,
sophisticated “scorer” would be to it. In the absence of this scorer, the game would be
diminished, and its athletes (lawyers and the legal system) underappreciated.
This means, then, that judges, properly understood in their most fundamental political
sense, are not simply observers of “balls and strikes.” They are instead essential to the existence
of balls and strikes in the first place. The key proposition is therefore this: Judges do not exist as
a part of modern political life to make the “easy” calls that make the sandlot game a bit more
efficient and (perhaps) fun and satisfying; they exist to make the frequent “hard” calls that our
circumstances now demand for us to remain a viable civil community. The “players” in this
“game” of civil life expect nothing less, for the game itself has been redefined by all of us to
include the presence, and authority, of these “official scorers.”
This observation, I think, gives additional perspective to the concept of “judicial
independence” about which we hear from time to time—quite often from the judiciary itself. 136
Judges are indeed not “players” in the drama of real life the way the rest of us are; they are
“scorers” who should be able to provide this vital function without being harassed by the players
or the fans. The ability of an umpire to end a dispute by throwing a player or manager out of the
game is therefore entirely appropriate and easily explained: At some point, to preserve the game
itself, interference with the umpire’s function must end, and the umpire is in fact in the best
position at that moment to make that determination. By the same token, judges must be able to
operate from a vantage of perspective “outside” the fray that produced the dispute that is before
them. It is not as if they do not live in our ordinary non-judicial communities—they most
certainly do. But those communities should not be able to dictate to a judge—once the issue of a
“score” has been brought before him or her—what the judge’s assessment of the situation should
be. 137
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Perhaps most daunting of all, however, is the further observation that because judges are
essential to the game, they are also essential to the values that constitute and justify the game. An
important additional conclusion is therefore unavoidable: Every judicial decision will be relevant
in some way to the values that are inherent in civil life, and the only question becomes whether
judges acknowledge that fact or attempt to hide from it.
The fact that hypertext permeates the legal process does not mean, however, that these
values are now clear and uncontroversial and readily available for reference in every judicial
decision. Quite the contrary, the only point here is that moral and political values are
unavoidably intertwined within every decision, even though those normative propositions can
remain murky and in serious dispute within civil society. Consequently, my complaint about
Chief Justice Roberts’s attempt at institutional modesty with his “balls and strikes” reference is
not that his analogy was inaccurate; it was instead misleading. It sounded like the job of judging
is a purely objective task of applying given facts to given legal texts, and the outcomes then
determine themselves—so long as the judge has a good pair of glasses to use when considering
all this material. If Chief Justice Roberts meant that his theory of judging was that judges should
not insinuate themselves personally into legal life to turn that game into “scorer’s discretion,”
that is one thing—one would hope that judges have not been elected or appointed for the purpose
of running amok. But if he meant that the values embedded and reflected in the legal world are
simply not relevant to a judge—that such considerations are to be conscientiously ignored or
denied—then that is something else altogether. It reflects a failure to understand the nature of
judging itself, which I am certain he does not in fact misperceive so badly. I therefore attribute
the remark simply to the convenient politics of the moment: the theater of the confirmation
hearing, where no one would attempt to unpack his remark carefully to see the difficulties and
contradictions contained within it.
VII. CONCLUSION: SUSPENDING CYNICISM
A “strike” isn’t simply a physical space, even if that physicality dominates the usual
analysis of it. A “lease” isn’t simply the document that seeks to memorialize it, even if the words
on that paper dominate the usual understanding of the relationship. A “statute” isn’t only the
words that comprise it, even if the initial inquiry into its meaning inevitably begins there. The
“art” of legal reasoning is the ability to understand any of these legal concepts thoroughly—
multi-dimensionally—which requires more analytic sophistication than commonly believed.
But that skill will inevitably entail anxiety occasionally as well. Thanks to Professor
Gould’s remarkable essay, Umpire Pinelli’s dilemma illustrates particularly well the struggle of
the conscientious decision maker to do “the right thing.” In facing any issue of “line-calling,”
where something must be declared to be inside or outside the boundary of some concept, like a
strike, the judgment we hope will be applied will always entail attention to the texts that attempt
to communicate and define the matter, the circumstantial contexts within which the matter is to
be approached and appreciated, the normative hypertexts that make the matter significant to us,
and the institutional political subtexts relevant to the institutions assigned to decide the matter.
There simply is no “simply” in “simply calling the balls and strikes.”
On the other hand, making these calls is not impossibly difficult either. The argument here
has been consistent with the classics on legal reasoning in that the emphasis has been on
incompetence. The point is that this dramatic decision is not made at the time of the controversial decision—in the
heat of the moment—but at regularly scheduled political (or employment) intervals.
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“reasoning” rather than particular results: An analytic process exists for assessing claims as to
“in-ness” or “out-ness,” and it is that method we demand of judges of all types, and which should
be watched carefully. Reasonable people can always disagree about outcomes; they cannot,
however, deny that a complicated, challenging, but accepted and respected, process lies
underneath all those conclusions.
Kierkegaard, therefore, did exaggerate: Decisions are not “moments of madness.” 138
Instead, they are instances of suspended cynicism. Judges must accept that their goal is not
perfection, but legitimate imperfection. Just as Professor Gould suggested, decision making in
complex human circumstances is not about “inviolable truth” but “truthful moments,” when one
accepts that one is operating in a world in which disagreement must be managed, rather than
agreement imposed. The classics in legal reasoning thus enjoy their status because they are
correct: Legal circumstances are murky, but they can be analyzed logically and rigorously, even
though the thinking will be suffused with values over which we clash.
This is inevitable, it is difficult, and it breeds controversy. Welcome to the law, and to the
angst of judging.
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